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Abstract 
When managers have objectives beyond maximizing monetary profits, inefficiencies may arise. An 
increase in competition may then force managers to improve the productivity of the firm in order to ensure 
survival. While this hypothesis has received ample theoretical attention, empirical evidence is scarce, 
mainly because preferences of managers are typically unobserved. In this paper, we exploit the fact that a 
large literature has documented specific non-monetary preferences of family managers. Using Spanish 
firm-level data, we compare how family-managed and professionally-managed firms react to import 
competition shocks. We find that import competition leads to productivity increases in family-managed 
firms that are initially unproductive. Productivity improvements are driven by family management as 
opposed to family ownership or non-managing family members. Furthermore, we show that these 
managers increase efficiency by reducing material usage, which is consistent with them trying to increase 
their short-term cash flow in order to survive. Finally, productivity improvements seem to be particularly 
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1 Introduction
How competition affects firm-level productivity and innovation is a central question in
economics. In particular, the answer to this question affects the assessment of important
policies such as trade liberalization or industry deregulation. A theoretical literature dating
back to Leibenstein (1966) has shown that the role of the manager, the key decision maker of
the firm, is critical. In particular, when a manager has preferences that include private benefits
and costs that go beyond monetary profits, a so called X-inefficiency may arise.1 In this case,
as competition increases the bankruptcy risk of a firm, thereby putting downward pressure
on profits; a manager may cut “slack” as a response and make the firm more productive to
ensure the survival of the firm (e.g., Hart, 1983; Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003).
While this “preference hypothesis” has received ample theoretical attention, empirical
evidence on it is relatively scarce (e.g., Schmitz Jr, 2005). This is due to the fact that researchers
typically do not observe variation in the preferences of managers. In this paper we exploit
a finding from the literature on family firms: family managers have been shown to have
very distinct preferences that include more than just enjoying monetary profits. For example,
family managers care about building a legacy and/or creating and sustaining the firm for
their descendants. Family managers also take a strong pride in their firm and have the ability
to use the firm’s resources for personal purposes or to provide jobs for relatives.2 All of these
examples generate a specific non-monetary private benefit for the family manager, which
is lost when the firm ceases to exist. In line with this motivation, family managers in Spain
report that their most important strategic objective is survival.3 At the same time, family firms
state that dealing with increasing competition is their main challenge.4 In this setting, when
market competition intensifies, family managers may try to make the firm more productive in
order to avoid bankruptcy.
In the empirical part of this paper we compare how family and professional managers
react to a shock to import competition, using Spanish firm-level data between 1993 and
2007. The Spanish context and data present a unique scenario to test whether managerial
preferences affect the productivity response to competition for the following reasons. First,
the Spanish data set reports family management versus professional management for family
owned firms. Family management can coincide with family ownership, but the Spanish data
1Note that the traditional principal-agency problem arises only when one assumes that principals, i.e., owners,
want to maximize profits, but the agents, i.e., managers, want to maximize something else. More generally,
however, owners’ objective functions may also include elements other than monetary profits.
2See, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003); Bandiera et al. (2014a); Hurst and
Pugsley (2011); Bertrand and Schoar (2006); Belenzon et al. (2014); Bandiera et al. (2014b)
3In a survey implemented by the Spanish Instituto de La Empresa Familiar that asks family firms about their
main strategic objectives, the most frequent answer by a large margin is guaranteeing the survival of the firm
(69.1%), followed by increasing the profits of the firm (48.7%) (Instituto de la Empresa Familiar, 2018).
451% of family firms report that increasing competition is their main challenge; the second most frequent
answer is the war for talent (40%) (KPMG, 2017).
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allows us to differentiate between the two. Family management may also be correlated with
the number of non-managing family members, which is also reported in the Spanish data.
These distinctions are important in order to verify the theoretical mechanism proposed in
the literature, as many unobservable characteristics related to family ownership and family
culture inside the firm (other than the preferences of the managers) can be controlled for.
Second, there were large increases in import competition, e.g., driven by increased European
integration and the unprecedented increase in Chinese exports that many other economies
have also faced.5 Importantly, we will exploit a specific feature of the Spanish setting: Spain’s
import tariffs are determined at the EU level and therefore arguably exogenous to Spanish
firms.
Our main empirical specification studies how changes in tariffs set by the EU affect
changes in the labor productivity of Spanish firms, distinguishing between family- and
professionally-managed (i.e., non-family-managed) firms. We allow the effects to differ by the
initial productivity of firms (even differently for family- and non-family-managed firms) so as
not to confound the effects of family management with the effects of initial productivity that
has been previously shown to be different in the literature.6 In essence, we are comparing
the productivity response of firms with and without family managers, holding their initial
productivity constant. We estimate a model in first differences of productivity changes on
tariff changes to absorb time-invariant firm-specific or industry-specific characteristics. We
add year fixed effects to absorb macroeconomic shocks, and industry fixed effects to allow for
industry-specific trends (since the model is already in first differences). Our results are robust
to more demanding specifications such as controlling for region-specific trends, industry-year
specific shocks to productivity growth rates, and firm-specific trends. While we focus on labor
productivity as our main outcome variable because of its transparency, the results are robust
to using a TFP measure in the spirit of the De Loecker (2007, 2013) modification to Olley and
Pakes (1996).7
Our empirical analysis uncovers a specific, robust pattern of heterogeneous responses.
After a reduction in import tariffs, the family firms in the left tail of the initial productivity
distribution (i.e., initially unproductive firms) increase productivity, while we do not observe
5E.g., US (Autor et al., 2013; Hombert and Matray, 2017), Canada (Kueng et al., 2017), UK (Bloom et al., 2016),
South Korea (Ahn et al., 2018), Vietnam (Dang, 2017), Peru (Medina, 2018).
6Studies focusing on heterogeneous effects of import competition have often found positive effects to be
present in large or productive firms, while effects for small or less productive firms have been found to be smaller,
or even negative. For some examples, see Muendler, 2004; Schor, 2004; Fernandes, 2007; Gorodnichenko et al.,
2010; Iacovone, 2012; Iacovone et al., 2011; Fernandes and Paunov, 2009; Autor et al., 2017; Bombardini et al., 2017;
Xu and Gong, 2017; Ahn et al., 2018.
7Specifically, we use the Olley and Pakes (1996)-type proxy estimator augmented with a De Loecker (2007;
2013)-type correction that allows for the management type and import tariffs to directly affect the evolution of
firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) to estimate firm-level TFP. In addition, we allow family firms to have
different technologies from non-family firms by including a dummy variable for family firms in the production
function.
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significant changes in the productivity of initially productive family firms or professionally-
managed firms. The key theoretical mechanism we are able to identify is that increased
product market competition (due to lower tariffs) incentivizes managers in firms that are
more likely to exit (i.e., initially unproductive firms) and have X-inefficiency (i.e., family firms)
to exert more effort in order to prevent their firms from going bankrupt.
In our robustness checks we rule out two types of alternative explanations. First, we
verify that family management, rather than other characteristics of family-managed firms,
drive our results by implementing a variety of checks. For instance, we conduct horse-race
regressions between family management and alternative firm-level characteristics such as
firm size, R&D intensity, or capital intensity. We also show that our results are not driven by
family ownership or by a switch towards professional managers. As a placebo exercise, we
check whether family members in non-managing positions generate similar results. While
we are admittedly not able to exploit exogenous variation in family management, excluding
a large number of alternative explanations makes it unlikely that characteristics other than
family management are generating our results.
Second, we check whether the productivity response is driven by import competition
rather than other potentially correlated shocks such as improved access to imported inputs
or foreign markets. However, controlling for changes of tariffs on inputs or the changes
in foreign tariffs faced by Spanish exporters does not change our results. Furthermore, the
affected firms do not show significant changes in the volume of imported technologies or
exports.
Why is the productivity response to import competition concentrated among family-
managed firms that are initially unproductive? We provide a stylized model that can ra-
tionalize our findings. In the model, all managers care about the profits of the firm, but
family managers derive an additional, constant utility from being a part of the family firm.
Importantly, they lose this additional utility if the firm goes bankrupt. This additional utility
captures the variety of private benefits to the family manager mentioned above. The profits
of the firm depend positively on productivity. Each firm receives an initial productivity draw
but managers can increase the productivity by exerting effort, which entails private costs.
Managers choose their effort in order to maximize utility. If the initial productivity of the firm
is far from the exit cutoff, professional and family managers choose the same level of effort,
which increases in the initial productivity. However, if the initial productivity of a firm is low,
family managers exert effort in order to avoid bankruptcy by making the firm break even,
while professional managers let the firm go bankrupt.
When an import competition shock hits the economy, potential profits of all firms fall.
This increases the bankruptcy risk for unproductive firms. Since family managers care more
about the existence of their firms, they exert an extra effort to avoid bankruptcy. If the
bankruptcy risk does not change, i.e., for firms with high initial productivity, there is no
4
change in productivity.
The model can rationalize our key empirical findings concerning how productivity re-
sponds to import competition. Furthermore, in contrast to alternative explanations that
we are aware of, the model matches additional empirical patterns. First, we show that the
productivity increases in the data are driven by increases in efficiency improvements rather
than innovation, which is in line with the motive of managers to increase cash flow on the
short run in order to ensure survival. Second, the empirical findings are particularly strong for
firms with a larger number of family managers, which are more likely to be multi-generational
businesses for which the mechanism is most relevant. Third, these multi-generational family
firms make organizational changes in order to improve efficiency, which are likely to cost
managerial effort but can be implemented relatively quickly. Fourth, the model is consistent
with the cross-sectional differences in the productivity distribution of family firms compared
to non-family firms. For example, the model predicts that the average productivity of family-
managed firms is lower than that of professionally managed firms. We obtain this prediction
not by assumption; instead, it is generated by the additional incentive for family managers
to keep their firms alive. Finally, our model predicts that unproductive non-family firms are
more likely to exit than family firms; and we find empirical support for this prediction.
Our paper is related to three strands of literature. First, our paper contributes to the litera-
ture on how trade liberalization affects firm productivity and innovation.8 Trade liberalization
tends to affect firms in different ways. While papers focusing on the effect of access to export
markets (e.g., Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Bustos, 2011; Coelli et al., 2018; Mayer et al., 2016) or
access to intermediate inputs (e.g., Amiti and Konings, 2007; Brandt et al., 2017; Fieler and
Harrison, 2018) tend to find positive effects on innovation and productivity, studies focusing
on the effect of import competition have found more divided results (e.g., Pavcnik (2002);
Amiti and Konings (2007); Bloom et al. (2016); Autor et al. (2017); Bombardini et al. (2017)).
Effects have also been found to be heterogeneous by firm size or initial productivity. In this
paper we focus on a novel dimension of heterogeneity, family management, that may affect
productivity responses to trade liberalization. Given that most developing countries host a
large number of family firms, and that the effects of import competition on productivity for
these countries have been found to be different from developed economies, studying this
dimension of heterogeneity seems to be particularly important.
Second, we contribute to the literature that studies the effect of competition on firm produc-
tivity and management practices via X-inefficiency. The existing theoretical studies provide
a range of models with a focus on managers with different preferences. In this literature, it
8For a review of this literature, see Shu and Steinwender (2019). Besides within-firm productivity improve-
ments, the literature also emphasizes that trade liberalization may increase aggregate productivity by reallocating
resources towards the most efficient firms (e.g., Pavcnik, 2002). A related literature examines how foreign direct
investment affects the productivity of firms (e.g., Guadalupe et al., 2012).
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is assumed that managers do not maximize firm profits as they consider private benefits as
well (e.g., Hart, 1983; Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003; Wu, 2011; Tello-Trillo, 2015).
As a result, a common prediction is that intensified market competition leads to a higher
bankruptcy risk and reduces managerial slack, as managers are willing to exert more effort
in order to avoid potential bankruptcy. Recent work on management practices (e.g., Bloom
and Van Reenen, 2007, 2010; Bloom et al., 2013) also finds that tougher market competition
(e.g., a smaller Herfindahl index or a higher import penetration ratio in the industry) is one
key force that incentivizes firms to improve their management practices and to implement
organizational innovations, by using cross-sectional survey data on management practices or
directly interviewing plant managers. We contribute to this literature empirically by explor-
ing how an exogenous shock to market competition affects productivity and organizational
innovations depending on the preferences of managers.
Third, we contribute to the literature on family firms.9 Family firms are an important
economic phenomenon. They are widespread, even in developed countries. For example,
15% of the American Fortune Global 500 firms are family firms. In Europe, 40% of large, listed
companies are controlled by families.10 In developing countries, family firms are even more
dominant: Out of large (>$1 billion) firms, 85% are family run in South-East Asia, 75% in
Latin America, 67% in India, and around 65% in the Middle East.11 Given their ubiquity, it
is important to understand the decision making process of family managers better. Most
papers in this literature document that family firms, and especially family-managed firms,
perform worse than non-family firms.12 We contribute to this literature by highlighting how
economic forces, specifically increased competition, can incentivize unproductive family firms
to become more productive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3
describes our empirical strategy, and Section 4 shows our empirical results. Section 5 rational-
izes these findings using a model with heterogeneous preferences of managers and Section 6
provides additional empirical evidence in support of the model. Section 7 concludes.
9E.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1986); Morck et al. (1988); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Morck et al. (2000); Anderson
and Reeb (2003); Pérez-González (2006); Villalonga and Amit (2006); Bennedsen et al. (2007); Gomez-Mejia et al.





12E.g., Morck et al. (2000); Bertrand and Schoar (2006); Pérez-González (2006); Villalonga and Amit (2006);
Bennedsen et al. (2007); Bloom and Van Reenen (2007); Bandiera et al. (2011, 2014b); Mullins and Schoar (2016);
Lemos et al. (2016). This has also been documented for Spanish family firms (Gallo and Estape, 1992) and is
consistent with our data. There are, however, papers in this literature arguing that family ownership is associated
with better firm performance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003). For example, family ownership can facilitate




We use panel data from a Spanish survey of manufacturing firms (ESEE; Encuesta Sobre
Estrategias Empresariales) that is collected by the Fundación SEPI, a foundation affiliated with
the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration.13 The survey is designed to cover
a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms and includes around 1,800 firms
per year. The survey started in 1990: In this year, participation of firms with more than 200
employees was required, while firms with more than 10 but fewer than 200 employees were
sampled via a stratified sampling approach based on detailed size and industry categories.
After that, SEPI made a great effort to replace non-responding and exiting firms with firms
from the same size and industry category to ensure the continuing representativeness of the
sample. Since the data on capital is incomplete before 1993 (e.g., information on intangible
capital and depreciation is not available) and the financial crisis in 2007 might have brought
about confounding shocks, we focus on the years between 1993 and 2007, covering a total of
around 4,000 observed firms.
The advantage of the Spanish data set is that it provides very rich information on several
dimensions that are important for our empirical analysis.14
Family firms. We distinguish between family-managed and professionally-managed firms
because the survey includes a variable that gives the number of “owners and working relatives
who hold managing positions.”15 We classify firms as family-managed firms (or family firms,
in short) if this number is bigger than or equal to one in the first year of our sample, 1993. We
use the first year of the sample for this definition in order to avoid a potentially endogenous
definition of management type that responds to changes in competition.16
Family firms are prevalent in Spain: Table 1 shows that 41% of our observations are family
firms. 58% of family firms in our sample have just one family manager, and none of the firms
have more than seven family managers (see online appendix for a histogram). Consistent with
the literature, family firms are on average smaller (both in terms of sales and employment),
have lower productivity, and spend less on R&D.17 Some of this difference is explained by
family firms operating in different industries, but significant differences remain even when
we control for industry fixed effects, as the last column in Table 1 shows.
The share of family firms ranges from 17% to 69% across different industries.18 Family
13For more information, see https://www.fundacionsepi.es/investigacion/esee/en/spresentacion.asp
14Note that additional details regarding the construction of our variables can be found in the online appendix.
15 Note that an owner is not necessarily a majority owner (this is not clearly specified in the survey) and a
founder is not necessarily an owner.
16In a robustness check we look at whether changes in management explain the productivity response.
17Figure E.4 in the online appendix shows the initial productivity distribution of family and non-family firms.
While the average productivity of non-family firms is higher, there is a significant overlap in the distributions.
18See Figure 1 in the online appendix. In the online appendix we also show tariff changes are uncorrelated with
changes in the share of family firms across industries or with the number of family managers within a firm.
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management is relatively persistent: 74% of family-managed firms in 1993 are still family-
managed in 2007. This finding is consistent with earlier work on Spanish family firms using
different data (Gallo and Pont, 1989).
Our main regressions use information on family members in managing positions. The data
set also includes information about the number of family members in non-managing positions,
which we use in a placebo test to differentiate family management from other non-managerial
aspects of family businesses. Furthermore we use a variable indicating whether the firm is
controlled by a family group as an indicator for family ownership and thereby distinguish
between family-owned and family-managed, and family-owned but professionally-managed
firms. This variable, however, is available for one year at the end of our sample, which is why
we use it only in robustness checks.
Productivity. We use labor productivity as our main measure of productivity as it is
transparent and can be directly observed in the data. Since we do not want to interpret
changes in output or input prices as changes in productivity, we exploit the fact that the
Spanish firm-level survey provides firm-specific deflators for inputs and outputs.19 Firms
are asked by what percentage the sales price of its products and the purchasing price of its
intermediate inputs and services have changed compared to the previous year. The price
changes are supposed to be calculated as a weighted average across various final products
and markets (for output prices) and a weighted average across various intermediate inputs,
energy consumption, and purchased services (for input prices). We use these price changes
to deflate output and intermediate inputs at the firm level (instead of using industry-wide
deflators). Overall, our measure of labor productivity is therefore given as deflated sales
minus deflated intermediate inputs divided by employment.20
Labor productivity does not exclude the contribution of capital to total output from
the productivity measure; and productivity changes might be driven by changes in the
capital stock. In robustness checks, we use the Olley and Pakes (1996)-type proxy estimator
approach augmented with a De Loecker (2007; 2013)-type correction. Specifically, we allow
the management type (i.e., family management or professional management), import and
export tariffs to directly affect the evolution of firm productivity to estimate firm-level total
factor productivity (TFP). Practically, we use a polynomial of the management type, the
(import and export) tariffs, investment and capital stock to proxy for the unobserved TFP. As
a result, we use this polynomial to run regressions in all three stages of the Olley and Pakes
19Ornaghi (2006) first demonstrated the usefulness of this feature in the Spanish firm-level data. The importance
of distinguishing between productivity and price changes has been noted in e.g., De Loecker (2011) and Beveren
(2012).
20Notice that this price correction can only be applied to changes in prices, not in order to compare differences
across firms. We normalize the price indices for each firm to be equal to 1 in 1993 (our base year), which means that
we measure labor productivity in 1993 in values. The price adjustment therefore compares changes in productivity
with respect to their initial levels in 1993.
8
(1996)-type estimation (additional details are provided in the online appendix).
Tariff data. This paper exploits variations in industry-specific import tariffs over time.
We use tariffs that the EU imposes on imports from the rest of the world (“import tariffs”)
to construct our main regressor. We use MFN tariffs from TRAINS (provided by UNCTAD)
accessed via the WITS software provided by the World Bank.21 We use the weighted average of
the import tariff in each product category (ISIC Rev. 3; 244 product categories) and aggregate
them to the NACECLIO industries that the Spanish data uses (20 NACECLIO categories22)
by using Spanish trade shares in 1993 (to avoid endogeneity of the weights). Our results are
robust to using trade shares from the previous year to calculate the industry-level tariffs. For
robustness checks we calculate average tariffs that other countries impose on exports from
the EU (“export tariffs”) as an indicator for export opportunities with the same methodology;
and import tariffs on the inputs (“input tariffs”) of an industry based on Spanish input-output
tables to control for changed access to imported inputs.
The resulting import tariffs are shown in Figure 1. Tariffs fell over time, especially during
the 1990s. Important trade liberalization episodes that occurred during the sample period
include several EU enlargement episodes (e.g., also studied by Berger and Nitsch, 2008; Bergin
and Lin, 2012; Brouwer et al., 2008) and China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 (also studied
in Bloom et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2013). A large heterogeneity of tariffs across industries is
also visible. Beverages, food/tobacco, meat related products, and textiles all started with the
highest tariffs. While tariffs dropped for food and drink related industries, tariffs on textiles
fell very little. Tariffs for leather/fur/footwear and vehicles also changed little and remain on
the higher end. Summary statistics of the tariff changes used in the regressions are given in
Table F.1 of the online appendix.
3 Empirical strategy
We start by estimating the effects of import competition separately for the set of family-
managed and professionally-managed firms. We then combine the separate regressions into a
pooled regression, which has three advantages: First, it allows us to test whether coefficients
are significantly different across family and non-family firms. Second, it allows us to check
whether our results are robust to adding industry-times-year fixed effects. Third, it allows us
to more efficiently conduct a variety of other robustness checks.
Separate regressions. We begin with an OLS regression of log productivity changes
21http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/
22The 20 industries are: meat related products; food and tobacco; beverage; textiles and clothing; leather, fur,
and footwear; timber; paper; printing and publishing; chemicals; plastic and rubber products; nonmetal mineral
products; basic metal products; fabricated metal products; industrial and agricultural equipment; office machinery,
data processing, precision instruments and similar; electric materials and accessories; vehicles and accessories;
other transportation materials; furniture; miscellaneous.
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∆lnplabproditq on changes in import competition ∆IMPst separately for family and non-family
firms. We allow for a potential heterogeneous effect depending on the firm’s log productivity
in our base year 1993, lnplabprod93iq, in line with literature on heterogeneous firms and trade
inspired by Melitz (2003),
∆lnplabproditq  β1∆IMPst   β2 p∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iqq
 β3  lnplabprod93iq   yearFE  industryFE  ηit (3.1)
where i denotes firm, s denotes industry, and t denotes year.
A few things should be noted: We add the interaction of import competition with initial
productivity because we are interested in heterogeneous effects for firms that are initially
unproductive versus those that are initially productive. Notice, however, that the magnitude
of coefficient β1 does not directly reveal the effect of import competition on productivity
for initially unproductive family firms as there are no firms with zero initial productivity.
Similarly, the coefficient β2 tells us how the effect changes as initial productivity increases,
but it does not tell us which sign the effects have for initially very productive firms. For this
reason we calculate the marginal effects of import competition for firms at the 10th percentile
(i.e., initially unproductive) and for firms at the 90th percentile (i.e., initially productive)
of the initial productivity distribution.23 For robustness, we also estimate the interaction
effect non-linearly with respect to different percentiles. However, it turns out that a linear
approximation works quite well.
For easier interpretation we use the negative of the industry- and year-specific EU import
tariff, denoted as IMPst, as our exogenous variation in import competition. This means when
IMPst increases, import competition increases due to a reduction in import tariffs. In general,
it is not always clear whether tariff changes can be interpreted as exogenous to firms and
industries as large companies often try to influence policy makers in order to obtain favorable
tariffs. However, in the Spanish case tariffs are negotiated at the European level and it is less
likely that Spanish firms are able to influence European decision making. Furthermore, many
tariff changes are part of a larger political process (e.g., the EU enlargement or China’s WTO
accession) and therefore likely out of the control of specific Spanish firms.
Our specification allows for year fixed effects to absorb macroeconomic shocks. Since the
model is in first differences, any time-invariant firm or industry characteristics are absorbed
as firm fixed effects in levels drop out in the first differences specification. We follow Autor
23
More specifically, we calculate marginal effects as B∆lnplabproditqB∆IMPst  β1   β2lnplabprod93iq and evaluate them at
the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial productivity distribution (across all firms; i.e., including both family and
non-family firms).
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et al. (2017) and make the empirical specification more demanding by adding industry-level
fixed effects to the estimation equation in first differences, allowing for industry specific time
trends. Historically, import tariffs have fallen while productivity has increased at the industry
level. These correlated trends should not be interpreted as causal evidence of a productivity
response to increased import competition.
Finally, all standard errors are two-way clustered at the firm level (to allow for autocorre-
lation within a firm over time) and industry-year level (to allow for correlation across firms in
the same industry).
Pooled regressions. Our main specification is a pooled OLS regression of family and
non-family firms with triple interaction terms that allow for differential effects of import
competition depending on a firm’s management type (family vs. non-family) and initial
productivity. The resulting, fully saturated regression equation is:
∆lnplabproditq  β1  ∆IMPst   β2  ∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq
 β3  ∆IMPst  FAM93i   β4  ∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i
 β5  FAM93i   β6  lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i   β7  lnplabprod93iq
 yearFEFAM93i   industryFEFAM93i   ηit (3.2)
We allow for family-firm-specific year and industry fixed effects. This ensures that all
coefficients in this regression are identical to the coefficients obtained from the separate
regressions for family and non-family firms. For example, coefficients β1 and β2 estimate the
effects of import competition for non-family firms, allowing for a differential effect by initial
productivity. Importantly, the advantage of the pooled regression is that it allows us to test
whether the estimated effect on family firms is significantly different from that of non-family
firms, which is estimated by coefficients β3 and β4 (again allowing for a differential effect
by initial productivity). Since we are interested in the effect on the initially least (p10) and
most (p90) productive firms, we compute marginal effects as discussed above.24 In addition,
we are able to compute marginal differential effects in these regressions. By focusing on these
marginal differential effects we are implicitly implementing two difference-in-differences
specifications (family versus non-family firms; before and after an import competition shock):
one for initially unproductive and one for initially productive firms, which we will report













 β1  β3 pβ2   β4q lnplabprod93iq, substituting
in the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial, overall productivity distribution.
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separately.25 As this is the most stringent specification, we are going to focus our interpretation
on these estimated effects.
Additional benefits of the pooled regression are that we are able to add industry-times-
year fixed effects; and that we are able to show a large number of robustness checks in a
simple and space-saving way.
4 Empirical results
Separate regressions. We start by dividing the sample into family-managed and professionally-
managed firms and estimate the effect on these two samples separately in Table 2. Columns
(1) and (5) already reveal that heterogeneity across these different types of firms is important:
Import competition has a positive and significant effect on the labor productivity of family
firms but a negative and insignificant effect on non-family firms.26 Note that this difference is
not driven by differences in initial productivity as we control for this.
In columns (2) and (6) we allow for additional heterogeneity with respect to initial produc-
tivity. The coefficient on import competition is large and significant for family firms and the
effect decreases as the initial productivity of firms increases. Interpreting the raw coefficients
is not meaningful, however, as there are no firms in the sample with an initial log productivity
of zero. We therefore evaluate the estimated effects for firms at the 10th and 90th percentile of
the initial productivity distribution, which are reported in the rows below the coefficients. We
can see that import competition has a large and positive effect on the productivity of initially
unproductive firms, but this effect fades out and there is an insignificant effect for initially
productive firms. When we implement the same exercise using the sample of non-family
firms, we see negative effects for both the initially least productive firms and the initially most
productive firms. However, all effects are insignificant.
In columns (3) and (7) we add region fixed effects to the regression and in columns (4) and
(8) we allow for firm-specific time trends but the results change very little. Overall, there is a
very robust, positive productivity response to import competition for initially unproductive
family firms.27
The magnitude of this effect is sizable. In our preferred specification in column (2) of
Table 2, a one percentage point reduction in the import tariff leads to a 4% increase in labor













β4lnplabprod93iq , substituting in the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial, overall productivity distribution.
26The average effect of import competition on labor productivity across all firms is positive, but insignificant
(see Table F.5 in the online appendix). The magnitude is similar to findings in the literature, e.g., Fernandes (2007);
Schor (2004); Amiti and Konings (2007).
27We also checked whether there are additional effects to lagged changes in import tariffs but we were not able
to find significant effects (see Table F.6 in the online appendix). The immediate response is consistent with the
motive to fight against bankruptcy in order to survive another day, which we present in the theoretical part of the
paper.
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productivity for the family firms with low initial productivity (10th percentile). Over the
sample period, the import tariff fell by 0.34 percentage points per year on average, so the
resulting average annual productivity increase is about 1.4% for the initially least productive
family firms. A large annual import tariff reduction (95th percentile), however, would be
associated with a 4.7% labor productivity increase for the initially least productive family
firms.
Non-parametric regressions. Regression equation (3.1) imposes a linear relationship
between the initial productivity and productivity changes after an import competition shock
hits. The estimation might disguise a non-linear or non-monotonic relationship in the data. In
order to check this, we also implement non-parametric versions of regression equation (3.1)
for both types of firms:










 yearFE  industryFE  ηit, (4.1)
where Perc93pi are dummy variables for firm i’s position in different percentiles p of the initial
productivity distribution. We experiment with different percentiles, using halves, terciles,
quartiles, and quintiles.
Figure 2 shows the effects graphically for the case of quintiles. Family firms that are in the
bottom two percentiles of the initial productivity distribution respond positively to import
competition but the response is smaller and insignificant for more productive firms. The
pattern across percentiles suggests that the linear interaction is indeed a good approximation.
In contrast, non-family firms respond negatively to import competition but the effect is mostly
insignificant. This pattern is consistent across different splits of percentiles of the data (see
Table F.7 in the online appendix).
Pooled regressions. In Table 3 we move to the pooled estimation given in regression
equation (3.2) that estimates the effects jointly for family and non-family firms. Column (1)
implements the pooled version of the separate regressions in columns (2) and (6) of Table
2. Using these estimates we can compute marginal effects for non-family and family firms
at various points of the initial productivity distribution. Table 3 reports marginal effects at
the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial productivity distribution and in Figure 3 we report
the results for the entire initial productivity distribution of family and non-family firms. The
effect on family firms decreases with firms’ initial productivity but it is positive and significant
even for the median-sized family firms, which indicates that our estimated effect is not just
relevant for a handful of unproductive family firms.
More importantly from an identification point of view, however, the pooled regression
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allows us to test whether the estimated effect is statistically different between family firms
and non-family firms. We implement this test in the last rows of Table 3 and see that the effect
on the initially least productive family firms is indeed statistically larger than the effect on the
initially least productive professionally managed firms. In order to save space and to simplify
the exposition, we are going to focus on these two marginal differential effects in following
tables.
The remaining columns in Table 3 add a number of different fixed effects to check the
robustness of the results. In column (2), we add regional fixed effects (separately for family
and non-family firms) to allow for confounding geographic trends. In column (3) we allow
for industry*year fixed effects to absorb any industry-year specific heterogeneity that might
be correlated with import competition. Taking this step leaves us unable to identify the
main effect of import competition but it is reassuring to see that all the interaction terms
remain almost unchanged. Turning to the marginal effects, while we cannot estimate the
main effects on family or non-family firms in this specification, we can identify the differential
effect of interest which is still significant. In column (4) we even control for firm fixed effects,
which allows for firm-specific trends in productivity (as the estimating equation is in first
differences). In short, our results are robust to including these various fixed effects.28
In Table F.8 of the online appendix we provide estimates in which we restrict the sample
to the period 1993 to 2000 — as can be seen in Figure 1, this was the period in which the tariffs
decreased most. It is reassuring to see that our estimates are not sensitive to the time horizon,
as the results are very similar; if anything, the differential effect for family versus non-family
firms is slightly stronger during the early period.
The number of family managers. So far we have compared firms with any family man-
agers with firms that have no family managers. Since our data includes the number of family
managers, we can refine our specification and interact the effects with the number of man-
agers. So far we have compared firms with any family managers with firms that have no
family managers. Since our data includes the number of family managers, we can refine our
specification and interact the effects with the number of managers. As Table F.9 in the online
appendix shows, firms with one family manager increase productivity significantly relative to
firms with professional managers. What is more is that the effect is estimated to be increasing
28In column (1) of Table F.10 we show that our results also hold when we use one-year lagged labor productivity
instead of labor productivity in 1993 as the interaction term. Using lagged productivity instead of productivity in
1993 in principle allows for the inclusion of entering firms later in the sample period. We show that our results
are robust to this inclusion in column (2) of Table F.10. However, in our main specifications we prefer to use
productivity in the base year, as while we can purge changes in productivity off changes in firm-specific input and
output prices, we cannot do this for the levels of productivity in the cross-section, and comparing productivity
levels across different years is therefore problematic. We tried to adjust for this by using annual productivity
percentiles instead of productivity levels in column (2) of Table F.10, but this is of course imperfect. Using initial
productivity has two additional advantages: It holds the sample of firms fixed, so we do not have to worry about
endogenous sample composition; and it restricts potential anticipatory productivity adjustments.
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in the number of family managers a firm has.
Alternative productivity measures. While labor productivity is a transparent measure,
it has one disadvantage: Increases may be driven by capital accumulation. In order to
investigate whether this is responsible for our main finding, we implement a structural
TFP estimation for robustness. We follow the recent literature by combining the Olley and
Pakes (1996)-type proxy estimator approach augmented with a De Loecker (2007; 2013)-type
correction that allows for family firms to have different technologies from non-family firms;
and the management type and import tariffs to directly affect the evolution of TFP. Our results
are robust to using this TFP measure (see Table F.11 in the online appendix), suggesting that
the estimates are driven by increases in productivity rather than increases in capital stock. In
the same table we also show that our results are robust to using alternative normalizations in
labor productivity (e.g., value added per number of hours worked, or value added divided by
total wage bill). In our main analysis we prefer using the simpler labor productivity measure,
as it does not depend on the assumptions required for TFP estimation.
In the following sections we implement robustness checks in order to rule out two types
of alternative explanations. First, we check whether family management rather than other
characteristics of family-managed firms drive our results. Second, we check whether the
productivity response is driven by increased import competition or by other potentially
correlated shocks such as improved access to imported inputs or foreign markets.
4.1 Robustness checks: family management
Given that we know family and non-family firms differ across observable and unobservable
characteristics, we want to understand whether our estimated effects are driven by family
management rather than other, correlated (observed or unobserved) firm characteristics. Since
we are not able to use an instrumental variable approach (e.g., as in Bennedsen et al. 2007) that
would make it possible for us to compare two identical firms that differ only by management
type, we implement several different tests.
Observable firm characteristics. In Table 4 we perform a horse race between family
management and other observable characteristics such as size, R&D intensity, and capital
intensity, allowing for productivity changes to depend on initial productivity just as in our
baseline specification.29 Column (1) repeats our baseline specification and in column (2) we
add an interaction term between import competition and the initial sales of the firm. This
specification allows the effects to differ across firms with different initial sizes and helps us
distinguish between the effects of family firms versus the effects of firm size. Interestingly, the
estimates on family firms are not affected by this inclusion and the coefficients on sales are
29Note that we do not need to test against differences in productivity as our baseline estimates already control
for initial productivity.
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not significant, suggesting that family management rather than size matters. In column (3)
we conduct the same exercise using initial employment as an alternative size measure with
the same results. In column (4) we perform the same exercise with initial R&D intensity and
in column (5) we allow the effect to vary by initial capital intensity. Neither inclusion has
an impact on the effects of family management. In fact, the differential marginal effects for
family firms at the lowest percentile are remarkably similar in magnitude. This is robust to
adding all alternative characteristics together in column (6).
As an alternative method, we use propensity score matching (PSM) techniques (inverse
propensity score re-weighting and nearest neighbor matching) using firm’s initial TFP, sales,
employment, and exporting status in another set of robustness checks. As a result of the
matching, family firms and non-family firms are distributed more equally across initial TFP
in our regressions. Our empirical results are robust to using either method (see Table F.12
provided in the online appendix).
Non-managing family members. Next, we explore more intangible characteristics of
family-managed firms. Since we also observe the number of family members in non-managing
positions, we can check whether those employees affect productivity in a way similar to that
of managing family members. If this is the case, we are likely measuring the effects of
some other more general characteristics of firms that are associated with families rather
than the specific effect of family management. We perform a horse race in column (2) of
Table 5 and test whether our effects are driven by family members in managing versus non-
managing positions. Specifically, we implement this by adding an interaction term with a
dummy variable for whether the firm has family members in non-managing positions.30 The
estimated effects confirm that management is the driving force behind productivity increases
as we do not find significant effects for firms with family members in non-managing positions.
In columns (3) and (4) we replace the family firm dummy variables with the number of
family members in managing and non-managing positions to exploit the full variation that
we have in the data.31 Our findings are unchanged: Again, productivity increases are driven
specifically by family management.
Family ownership. Family-managed firms are owned by families and family ownership
has been shown to affect the governance of firms in various ways (e.g., Suáre and Santana-
Martín 2004; Kim and Lu 2011), generating different incentives for undertaking innovation
(e.g., differential tax incentives, different types of assets, different political connections, or
different time horizon of running the business). In column (1) of Table 6, we test whether
family management rather than family ownership is driving our results by restricting the
30Note that, while having family managers in managing and non-managing positions is positively correlated,
the correlation between the dummy variables is only 0.37 as we have firms in the sample that have family members
in managing but not non-managing positions and vice versa.
31The number of family members in non-managing positions ranges between 1 and 6. See the online appendix
for a histogram and more details.
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sample to family-owned firms. Unfortunately the information on family ownership is only
available at the very end of our sample, in 2006. We therefore need to assume that family
ownership is unchanged over time and use the value in 2006 to identify family owned
firms. When we restrict the sample to family owned firms, the marginal effects compare
family owned and family-managed firms to family owned but professionally managed firms. The
marginal effects in column (2) reveal that import competition increases the productivity of
family-managed, family owned firms by more than those of professionally managed, but
family owned firms, confirming our hypotheses that family management rather than other
aspects of family firms are driving our results. Given that the ownership variable is available
only at the end of the period, this is admittedly a rough test. However, it is the best we can do
using the data in hand and nevertheless reassuring that our results hold.
Switch towards professional managers. As a final step we want to make sure that pro-
ductivity improvements are not only driven by firms that replace their family managers by
professional managers. Column (3) of Table 6 checks whether the observed productivity
improvements are driven by firms that replaced their family managers by professional man-
agers. In order to do this, we exclude firms that are initially family-managed but switch to
professional management at some point in the sample. It is reassuring to see that the results
are not driven by those switchers. If anything, our findings seem to become stronger in
magnitude. In a similar spirit, we check directly whether family management changes as a
response to import competition in column (4) by using the change in the time-varying family
firm dummy variable as a dependent variable. While the marginal differential effects reveal
a small positive effect for initially unproductive firms, the effect is insignificantly different
from zero.32 Overall, switches between family and non-family management cannot be used
to rationalize our empirical findings.
4.2 Robustness check: import competition
While a reduction in tariffs increases import competition, this is not the only trade-related
channel through which domestic firms are affected (Shu and Steinwender, 2019). First,
reduced tariffs also have positive effects on domestic firms as they can import intermediate
inputs more cheaply. Second, trade negotiations are often bilateral, resulting in two economies
reducing the tariffs on each other, possibly for the same products. This results in another
positive effect on firms as they obtain better access to the foreign market by exporting. In
what follows, we test whether our regressions are indeed capturing the effect of increased
import competition as opposed to better access to imported inputs or export markets.
Imported inputs. Access to inputs has been shown to increase productivity (e.g., Amiti
32The interpretation of the magnitude of the effects is as follows: An increase in import competition triggered
by a 1pp tariff reduction leads to an increased likelihood of a firm changing management type by 1.7pp for the
initially unproductive firms.
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and Konings, 2007; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011). The productivity increase may be driven
by lower prices or higher quality of imported inputs, or different inputs may allow for a more
efficient arrangement of the production process. The first channel, increased productivity via
lower input prices, is unlikely to show up in our estimates as our productivity changes are
already purged of changes in input prices (see discussion in the data section). Furthermore,
for these effects to show up in our estimates, they must be larger for initially unproductive
firms — the limited empirical evidence on these heterogeneous effects however suggests the
opposite (Iacovone, 2012). Nonetheless we can directly control for access to foreign inputs
by including the change in input tariffs INTARst (and its interaction terms with the initial
productivity and initial status of family management) to our regression. Column (2) of Table
F.13 in the online appendix conducts this exercise. The coefficients on input tariffs confirm
that the effect of better access to intermediate inputs is positive for initially unproductive
rather than productive firms but it is not statistically different between family and non-family
firms. More importantly, it barely changes the effect of import competition: The effect is still
positive for unproductive family relative to non-family firms.33
Export opportunities. The literature has also shown that better access to export markets
leads to productivity increases (e.g., Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Bustos, 2011; Iacovone, 2012;
Mayer et al., 2016; Munch and Schaur, 2018). However, whether more or less productive
firms are affected is less clear. Existing papers suggest that the positive effect is the largest
at the lower (Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Munch and Schaur, 2018), the middle (Bustos, 2011)
or the upper end of the productivity distribution (Iacovone, 2012). In addition, there is no
evidence that this affects family firms differentially from non-family firms. In order to directly
test this explanation, we control for the full interactions with “export tariffs,” i.e., tariffs
other countries impose on exports originating from the EU, EXPTARst. In column (3) of
the table titled “Controlling for input and export tariffs” in the online appendix, we see
that the effect of better access to export markets is positive for initially productive rather
than unproductive firms and larger for family than non-family firms. But this effect is not
statistically different between family and non-family firms. Importantly, this exercise does not
eliminate the differential effect of import competition on family relative to non-family firms.34
33In Table F.14 in the online appendix we show additional evidence that better access to imported inputs
does confound our estimates: We check whether import competition leads unproductive family firms to start
importing, increase their imports, start importing technology, or increase their imports of technology. We do not
find significant effects of any.
34In Table F.14 in the online appendix we show additional evidence that better access to export markets does not
confound our estimates: We check whether import competition leads unproductive family firms to start exporting
or increase their exports but we do not find significant effects of either.
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5 Model
In this section we present a model that rationalizes our main empirical findings: After
a reduction in import tariffs, family-managed firms at the lower end of the productivity
distribution respond by increasing productivity. In our model we suggest that this is due to
the specific preferences of family managers. Specifically, they care about the survival of the
family firm by itself and do not want to let the firm go bankrupt. We model this by giving
family managers additional utility when the family firm exists, which they lose when the
family firm goes bankrupt.35
There is ample evidence in favor of this type of preferences in the literature on family
firms. Family managers have been shown to obtain a wide range of personal benefits from
running the firm (e.g., Hurst and Pugsley, 2011; Bandiera et al., 2014a; Belenzon et al., 2014;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Besley and Ghatak, 2005; Prendergast, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2008;
Mullins and Schoar, 2016; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). For example, there is emotional
attachment to the firm; the family firm also might allow for an increased social status or even
allow for personal identification. People have been shown to have a preference for eponymy
and empire building. Family managers may like to pass the firm on to the next generation.
But they may also just enjoy being their own boss, having flexible work hours, using the firm
resources for private purposes, or having the opportunity to use the firm to address family
issues (e.g., finding a prestigious job for a low-ability offspring).
We start with a static partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and endogenous
productivity, i.e., the firm’s managers have the possibility to exert effort and increase the
productivity of the firm. The key novel element of the model in this paper is that we allow
managers to have heterogeneous preferences with respect to non-monetary private benefits
of running the firm. This generates differential productivity responses to a change in the
competitiveness of the market. Our model is general and just distinguishes between two
types of managers: We assume that compared to P-type (i.e., professional) managers, F-type
(i.e, family) managers derive (more) non-monetary private benefits from running the firm
which they only receive when the firm exists.
5.1 Setup
Firm profits. We assume that each firm draws a random initial productivity φ upon entry. The
initial productivity draw is fixed throughout the model and its cumulative density function
(CDF) is assumed to be Gpφq. Firm profits are positively related to the exogenous productivity
35Note that the driving feature of our model revolves around the characteristics of the manager of the firm rather
than the owner or a non-managing employee of the firm. Therefore, we abstract from theoretical explanations that
are based on the latter (e.g. tax incentives, political connections, asset mixes, or investment horizons that differ for
family owned vs non family owned firms).
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draw. Managers can exert effort β which increases ex post firm productivity endogenously.
We model the firm’s profits π in the following stylized way:
π  pη   φβq  f .
The first term, η, is an exogenous market environment parameter that leads to decreased
profits when import competition increases. We label the second term realized productivity, φβ,
of the firm which is a positive function of the initial productivity draw and managerial effort.
We assume that there is a complementarity between exerting effort and the initial productivity
draw, meaning that the marginal return to exerting effort increases with the initial draw. We
label these two terms together variable or operating profits, η   φβ.
Finally, the third term in the profit function is a fixed cost of production f which the firm
incurs in order to produce. If the variable profits are not enough to cover the fixed cost, the
firm exits — the model therefore allows for endogenous exits. Furthermore, the manager can
also let the firm exit and obtain zero utility without exerting any effort (i.e., the manager’s
outside option yields zero utility). However, if total profits (i.e., variable profits minus the
fixed cost) are negative after the effort is exerted, the firm is forced to exit even if the manager
would like to continue operating the firm, as our model is a static model. In this case, the
manager obtains zero monetary income but still has to bear the disutility of exerting effort. In
short, exit is not chosen by the owner or the manager once the manager has exerted effort.36
Utility functions. The manager derives utility from both firm profits and non-monetary
private benefits, which exist only when the firm exists. As we have argued above, we
assume that F-type managers derive more of these private benefits than P-type managers. For
simplicity, in what follows we assume that only F-type managers derive the non-monetary
private benefits. However, the empirical predictions of the model are unchanged even if we
allow for a private benefit of P-type managers, as long as it is small enough (and smaller than
that of F-type managers).37 The utility of the manager also includes a private, convex cost of
exerting effort, which is assumed to be the same for both type of managers.




pη   φβq  f  12 β
2   Ū if firm exists;
0 if firm exits,
(5.1)
where 12 β
2 is the effort cost and Ū represents the non-monetary private benefits.
The utility function of P-type managers differs from that of F-type managers only by the
36We implicitly assume that the firm cannot borrow and the manager cannot use his or her own wealth to
cover the firm’s losses in order to prevent the firm from exiting. This is true in our model, as the model is static.
In addition, this seems to be a reasonable assumption as firms that go bankrupt probably face severe financial
constraints and managers of those firms are likely also facing personal financial constraints.
37For a more details on this, see our discussion after Proposition 3.
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pη   φβq  f  12 β
2 if firm exists;
0 if firm exits.
(5.2)
5.2 Effort choice and realized productivity
In this subsection we derive the optimal effort choice of both managers. The following
proposition summarizes our result.
Proposition 1 (Optimal effort choice). Assume f ¥ η and Ū ¡ fη2 ,
38 then:
1. The optimal effort choice for a P-type manager is given by:
βPpφq  φ if φ ¥
b
2p f  ηq  φ̄P
P-type managers with productivity draws below φ̄P exit the market.
2. The effort function of the P-type manager is increasing in φ.




φ if φ ¥
a
p f  ηq
fη








F-type managers with productivity draws below φ̄F exit the market.
4. The effort function of the F-type manager is initially decreasing in φ and later increasing in φ
(i.e., the relationship is “U-shaped”).
Proof. In appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal effort as a function of initial productivity draw for P-type
managers and for F-type managers. If productivity is high, i.e., above φ̄P, both F-type and
P-type managers behave in the same way. For both type of managers, effort increasing
in the initial productivity draw, because the two are complements. However, when initial
productivity is below φ̄P, P-type managers let the firm exit, while F-type managers prefer to
38The first assumption is a technical assumption, which is needed to generate endogenous exits. Otherwise,
managers with any productivity draw can make their firms survive and obtain positive payoffs by choosing zero
effort. The second assumption states that the private benefits are big enough such that even when the firm’s final
profits are zero (under the effort level that ignores the private benefits), F-type managers still have incentives to
keep their firms alive by exerting more effort. Without the second assumption, the model would not generate a
positive productivity response from initially unproductive family firms under tougher import competition, which
is the purpose of the model.
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keep the firm alive in order to reap the private benefits. This creates an incentive for F-type
manager to work harder and this incentive is larger the lower the initial productivity. If the
initial productivity is too low, i.e., below even φ̄F, ensuring firm survival requires too much
effort and the F-type manager prefers to exit. Overall, the exit cutoff is lower for F-type
managers than for P-type managers.
The kink in the effort function of F-type managers in Figure 4 also illustrates that there
are two different ways in which the F-type manager is incentivized to exert effort. Below the
kink, when the effort function is decreasing, the F-type manager exerts effort in order to make
their firms break even and stay in the market. For further exposition, we label managers with
initial productivity in this region the constrained managers. Above the kink, when the effort
function is increasing, she exerts effort in order to increase the marginal profitability of the
firm. We label these managers the unconstrained managers.
In addition to the predictions for effort choices, the model also has the following implica-
tions for productivity:
Proposition 2 (Realized productivity). Assume f ¥ η and Ū ¡ fη2 , then:
1. Realized productivity of firms with P-type managers, βPpφqφ, increases in φ when φ ¥ φ̄P.






and increasing in φ for φ ¥
a
f  η.
3. Average realized productivity of firms with P-type managers is higher than that of firms with
F-type managers.
4. Assume that the initial productivity draw follows the same Pareto distribution for both F-type
firms and P-type firms. Then, the distribution of realized productivity of P-type firms first order
stochastically dominates that of F-type firms.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 5 illustrates how realized log productivity, which is a combination of the initial
productivity draw and the optimally chosen effort, varies with the initial productivity draw
for P-type managers and for F-type managers. Realized productivity weakly increases in
the initial productivity for both type of managers but more importantly, as the exit cutoff for
professional firms is larger, average observed productivity for P-type firms is higher than that
of F-type firms.
5.3 Impact of import competition on productivity
In this subsection we analyze how stiffer import competition affects the realized productivity
of F-type firms and P-type firms differentially. Specifically, we conduct a comparative statics
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exercise of a decrease in η (i.e., an increase in import competition) on managerial effort and
firm productivity. We use subscripts “before” and “after” to denote variables before and after a
reduction in import tariffs. The following propositions state formally how tougher import
competition affects F-type firms and P-type firms differently:
Proposition 3 (Productivity change for F-type firms and P-type firms). Assume f ¥ η and
Ū ¡ fη2 . Suppose the market environment parameter decreases from η1 to η2, i.e., import competition
increases. Then:
1. The realized productivity of each surviving P-type firm is not affected.
2. For surviving F-type firms, the initially least productive surviving firms increase their realized
productivity, whereas the initially most productive surviving firms do not change their realized
productivity.
3. For the initially most productive surviving firms, the induced productivity change of F-type
and P-type firms is the same. For the initially least productive surviving firms, the productivity
change for F-type firms is larger than that of P-type firms.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 6 illustrates the change in the managerial effort and firm productivity graphically
in response to an increase in import competition. The least productive surviving F-type firms
increase productivity as stiffer import competition incentivizes their managers to exert more
effort to ensure the survival of their firms (i.e., by just earning non-negative profits). On the
contrary, the most productive surviving F-type firms and all P-type firms do not change their
productivity, as their managers’ effort does not depend on the market environment parameter.
This is the main proposition of our simple, stylized model that can rationalize our empirical
findings.
It is worth noting that the empirical predictions of the above proposition do not depend on
the assumption that P-type managers receive no private benefits by running the firms. In fact,
as long as the private benefits P-type managers receive are smaller than fη2 (i.e., Ū ¤
fη
2 ,
which is opposite the assumption made for the private benefits of F-type managers), the effort
choice is still φ for all P-type managers, which does not respond to a change in the market
environment parameter η. As a result, their effort and their firms’ productivity do not change
after import competition increases. In short, our results hold as long as the private benefits
of F-type managers are above — and the benefits of P-type managers are below — a certain
threshold.
Proposition 4 (Exits). Assume f ¥ η and Ū ¡ fη2 . Suppose the market environment parameter
decreases from η1 to η2, i.e., import competition increases. Then:
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1. The exit cutoff on realized log productivity increases for both F-type firms and P-type firms. As
a result, the least productive firms of either type exit.
2. For firms with the same realized initial productivity, P-type firms are more likely to exit than
F-type firms.
Proof. See appendix.
6 Additional empirical evidence
The objective of the model was to provide a rationale for explaining our main results in the
data: Initially unproductive family firms increase their productivity in response to an import
competition shock, while we see no significant changes for initially productive family firms or
non-family firms (Table 3). Proposition 3 qualitatively predicts this pattern.39 However, ours
may not be the only model that can rationalize the empirical findings. We therefore explore in
this section how likely it is that the mechanism proposed in the model is the correct one, and
whether additional predictions of the model are consistent with the data.
Innovation. We start by investigating what kind of activities managers undertake in
response to import competition. In column (2) of Table 7 we check whether firms that
respond to import competition also start to perform R&D activities, using the change in
the R&D dummy variable as a dependent variable. However, we cannot find significant
marginal effects. In column (3) we use the change in the R&D expenses that a firm reports
as a dependent variable.40 Family firms at both ends of the productivity distribution report
increased spending relative to non-family firms, but the estimated effects are not significant.
In column (4) we check whether the firm reports a change in the number of patents. We
estimate positive effects for initially unproductive family firms relative to non-family firms,
but the effects are again insignificant.41
Overall, we do not see a differential increase in innovation related activities in response to
import competition. This is consistent with the mechanism in the model. R&D and patenting
are innovation activities that span a longer time horizon, and are therefore not suitable to
increase cash flow to ensure survival. Furthermore, firms that are faced with increased
bankruptcy risk due to tougher import competition probably do not have the resources in
order to invest into R&D.
39Note that strictly speaking, the model predicts a sharp non-linear effect of import competition on the
productivity of family firms, whereas our data suggests a more linear effect. Measurement error in productivity or
uncertainty with respect to how effort translates into productivity could smooth the strict prediction of the model.
40Note that we can only do this for firms that report positive R&D expenses, which explains why the sample
size drops significantly.
41We also checked whether product or process innovation changed, but did not find significant effects. Notice
that the effects on productivity in column (1) are robust to restricting the sample to the ones used in columns (2)
to (4).
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Efficiency. In Table 8 we conduct another exercise to shed light on what is going on
inside the firm by regressing the different components of labor productivity separately on
import competition and the respective interaction terms. Comparing columns (2), deflated
value added, with column (5), employment, we see that increases in value added rather
than reductions in employment drive the productivity increase.42 Decomposing value added
into sales in column (3) and material in column (4) makes clear that initially unproductive
family firms increase their labor productivity by reducing their material inputs (rather than
increasing their sales). We also show in column (6) that productivity improvements are not
driven by increases in the capital stock.43
This is again evidence in support of the mechanism in the model, as it suggests that firms
are trying to use their materials more efficiently in order to increase their short-term cash
flow and their survival probability. Managers may be able to improve material efficiency in a
variety of ways: They may source the buying inputs at lower prices, they may run down the
material inventories, or they may use the same material inputs more efficiently in production.
Either interpretation is consistent with the mechanism in the model, in which managers are
trying to ensure survival into the next period. But we can dig a little bit deeper.
First, we know that the decrease in material usage is not driven by using cheaper materials,
as we already deflated material expenditure by change in material prices.44 This also implies
that we do not purely see reduced tunneling of profits to suppliers when import competition
increases (Bertrand et al., 2002).
Second, if the effects were driven by a run-down in inventory, they would have to be
restocked in the next period. As a result, we would see an equivalent productivity decrease
in the following period. However, when we run our regressions on changes over two years,
we still find significant positive effects of import competition on the productivity of initially
unproductive family firms (results in Table F.16 of the online appendix). The most likely
explanation for our findings is therefore that managers are using the same material inputs
more efficiently in the production process to generate more output.
Reducing waste in material usage and inventory is an integral part of lean manufacturing
(e.g., a part of the so called “5 S” workplace organization method), a method often used
by companies trying to increase profitability in the face of increased competition. While
lean approaches require effort on the part of managers and employees to identify waste,
the changes can be implemented relatively quickly and improve the cash flow position of a
company (Liker and Meier, 2005).
42This is maybe not surprising as the Spanish labor market has been characterized as very rigid. In Table F.15 in
the online appendix we also check whether the workers supplied by a temporary agency or total employment of
family members changed, but we did not find significant effects.
43This is consistent with our results in Table F.11 of the online appendix, in which we show that the productivity
increases are also reflected in TFP increases.
44We also checked whether import competition affected input prices, but there are no significant effects.
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Since our Spanish data is confidential, we cannot investigate what has happened to
individual businesses in order to provide anecdotal evidence of the mechanism we find.
However, a case study from an American family business may be illustrative: Watlow is a
family-owned manufacturer in St. Louis, MO, US, which was founded in 1922. The current
CEO Peter Desloge is a third generation member of the founding family. He adopted lean
production principles at Watlow in 2006, explaining: “A competitive environment forced us to
figure out how to lower our costs while also better engaging our people.” The lean approach
led Watlow to identify and eliminate waste in all production steps. As an example, the
company discovered that it could eliminate an unnecessary part in a temperature controller.
Mr. Desloge explains: “When it got to their facility, the customer was taking the cover off
because they had to install it in their machine. We realized we could ship without it and
eliminate both the effort on our end as well as for the customer.” While competition was
the initial force to adopt lean, the company states that it has since then used lean not only to
reduce cost, but as a growth strategy.45
Overall, these results are consistent with managers putting more effort towards increasing
efficiency (by reducing material usage and eliminating waste) rather than innovation (by
increasing R&D or patenting). The former can help to increase efficiency, improve cash flows
and therefore avoid immediate bankruptcy, whereas the latter improves long-run success, but
is more risky if the firm does not survive. This is consistent with the mechanism in the model,
which is triggered by the motive to keep the firm alive another day.
Multi-generational family firms. The model assumes that family managers care more
about the survival of the firm than professional managers, in line with the findings in the
literature on family firms. In Table 9 we test this assumption directly by checking whether our
results are stronger for those family managers whom we suspect to be especially motivated to
keep the family firm alive in the long run: multi-generational firms, which we measure by the
number of family managers present. While we do not have an exact measure of the number
of generations, we think that these firms correspond closest to a multi-generational family
firm. Column (1) repeats the result for non-family firms, and in columns (2) and (3) we split
the sample of family firms into those that have one family manager versus those that have
more than one family manager. The effect for initially unproductive firms is larger for the
latter. Columns (4) to (6) repeat the same regressions with firm fixed effects, we see a very
similar pattern.
The firms in our data set also report whether they have introduced new organizational
methods in process innovation. These new methods would be consistent with changes in the
organization of the workplace mentioned above that can improve efficiency. When we use the
dummy variable of organizational changes in Panel B of Table 9, we find again that the effect
45https://www.watlow.com/about-watlow/working-at-watlow (accessed Dec 20, 2019).
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is positive for initially unproductive family firm, and the effect is stronger for family firm
with more than one family manager. The effects are imprecisely estimated, but when we also
control for firm fixed effects in columns (4) to (6), they become stronger and more significant.
As a placebo test we also use the alternative way to implement process organization, i.e., by
introducing new machinery, as dependent variable in panel C. Using this variable, we do not
see a pattern across firms with a different number of family managers, and the results vary in
sign and are insignificant.
While these results are not all very precisely estimated and therefore not strong enough to
be a strict test of the model, we interpret them as suggestive of our proposed mechanism: A
re-organization of the workplace costs managerial effort, and family managers are especially
willing to undertake this effort when survival is threatened. The changes in organizational
methods do not require additional investment in contrast to the introduction of new machinery,
they may be quick to implement, and are likely to result in efficiency gains.
Cross-sectional productivity differences. The model has additional predictions that we
can check in the data. First, while we are interested in explaining productivity changes, the
model yields predictions concerning differences in the productivity distribution of family
versus non-family firms in the cross section. Most noticeable, Proposition 2 explains that
family firms are, on average, less productive than non-family firms. This is a frequent finding
of the literature and also supported in our data, as Table 1 shows. The literature usually
rationalizes this finding using assumptions of worse abilities or lower willingness to work of
family managers (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Bandiera et al., 2014a; Bloom et al., 2012). In
our model, however, family managers have the same initial abilities as non-family managers
on average, since the distribution of the productivity draws is the same for both types of
firms. Also, they exert either the same level of effort or even more: They keep putting in effort
for initially unproductive firms that professional managers would have let go bankrupt. Yet,
precisely because of the desire to keep unproductive family firms alive, the model results in
lower (average) realized productivity for family firms.
Proposition 2 also predicts that the distribution of realized productivities of non-family
firms first-order stochastically dominates that of family firms. Figure 7 plots the empirical
CDF of the log labor productivity for both types of firms. The figure shows that this prediction
indeed holds in the data.
Exits. Another prediction from the model is Proposition 4, which states that import
competition leads to exits of non-productive firms of either type. In Table F.17 in the online
appendix we see that import competition indeed leads to exits.46 Overall, a fall in import
tariffs by 1pp increases the average probability of exit by 0.2pp. In Figure 8 we run non-
parametric regressions of import competition on exits by tercile in the initial productivity
46Exiting firms include closed firms, firms in liquidation, and firms that are taken over by other firms.
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distribution, separately for family and non-family firms.47 The exit probability is indeed
largest for unproductive non-family firms, as our proposition suggests, and statistically
different from zero. The magnitude implies that for these firms, an increase in import tariffs
by 1 percentage point implies an increase in the exit probability by 0.6 percentage points.
One note of caution: While this is supportive evidence of the mechanism described in the
model, the standard errors are too large to conclude that the exit probabilities are statistically
different from the exit probabilities of family-firms for the lowest tercile.48
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we use rich, firm-level data from Spain and changes in EU-imposed import
tariffs between 1993 and 2007 to study how stiffer import competition affects productivity
of firms depending on their manager type. We find that family-managed firms with initially
low productivity show significant productivity increases after a reduction of import tariffs.
This is in contrast to initially very productive family firms as well as non-family firms,
whose productivity is not affected by import competition. This finding is driven by family
management rather than family ownership or other characteristics of family firms. In addition,
these productivity increases seem to be driven by a more efficient use of input materials rather
than innovation activities like R&D or patenting. This shows that family managers that face
increased bankruptcy risk try to improve their cash flow position in order to ensure survival
into the next period.
We propose a model featuring heterogeneity in managers’ preferences in order to ratio-
nalize the empirical findings. Motivated by the literature, we assume that family managers
receive additional private benefits when their firm exists. When import competition increases,
the bankruptcy risk of the initially unproductive firms increases. Family managers increase
effort which makes the firm more productive and ensures survival, while professional man-
agers let the firm exit. Consistent with this notion of the preferences of family managers, our
findings are empirically stronger for multi-generational family firms.
Our findings give us the following picture of family firms. Family firms have a long term
view and their most important goal is survival for future generations. However, in the short
run, they are not necessarily maximizing monetary profits. Family firms have been reported
to be averse to change (unless strictly necessary to ensure survival), and are more likely to
be busy dealing with family related issues. These firms may also be less willing to cause
disruption among employees who they often view as part of their family/responsibility, or the
47Given that the effect of import competition is predicted to be non-linear in initial productivity, i.e., much more
pronounced for initially unproductive firms, this specification is more consistent with the data and model than
the linear interaction terms that we use for other outcomes.
48The difference between family and non-family firms in the lowest tercile is -0.50 (0.49), with a p-value of 0.305.
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family managers may prefer non-monetary benefits such as leisure. However, once survival
is threatened, they have been reported to be more agile to react as there is less bureaucracy
and the family-like culture can be an asset that unifies employees and owners during these
times (Deloitte University EMEA CVBA, 2017).
One of the authors of this paper had an encounter with a European family firm that
supports this interpretation. The family business was doing well economically, but during
a company visit we noticed that the shop floor looked anything but a textbook example
of modern workplace organization: waste and scrap in random places; old, not always
functioning machinery; hard to read or misplaced signs of the production processes. When we
asked the family manager why they had not considered more modern workplace organization
such as lean management, they answered that while they were aware of potential efficiency
gains (the manager had an MBA), they had little motivation to change operations: “Why
should we do this? We are doing well economically, and a re-organization, especially if
we brought in external consultants, would cause a disturbance to our workers, who have
been with us for generations”. When asked whether their view would change if competition
threatened the survival of the firm, the manager immediately replied that long-term survival
was the most important goal of the company, and everything necessary to ensure survival
would be implemented.
Our results shed light on the behavior of family firms, which contribute to a large share
of economic activities in many countries throughout the world. Economists have long been
worried about the implications of unsatisfactory performance of family firms on welfare and
aggregate productivity. At the same time, the surge of China’s exports in recent decades has
increased the bankruptcy risk of these vulnerable firms. Our findings suggest that the attach-
ment of family managers to their firms creates a stronger motive to “fight” against bankruptcy
when the import shock hits. This mechanism may help to reconcile the mixed evidence in
existing empirical studies, which have found positive effects for emerging economies that
typically host a large number of family managers.
Also, this positive effect of import competition is in contrast to the literature that has
pictured family managers as less able or less productive. However, all is not well: The
increased effort is targeted towards improving short-term efficiency (to ensure survival)
rather than long-term productivity based on innovation or research and development. Future
research should focus on embedding these findings into a general equilibrium trade model
that can help us understand how the difference in managers’ preferences affects gains in
aggregate productivity and welfare after trade liberalization.
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Figure 1: EU import tariffs over time
Source: TRAINS database (provided by UNCTAD), accessed by World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), wits.
worldbank.org
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Figure 2: Effect of import competition on labor productivity: Non-parametric estimation
Figure 3: Effect of import competition
Figure 4: Effort choices of F-type and P-type firms
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Figure 5: Realized log productivity across firms
Figure 6: Effect of increased import competition on managerial effort and realized productivity
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Figure 7: Empirical CDF of log labor productivity
Figure 8: Effect of import competition on exit probabilities, by initial productivity
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B Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Spanish manufacturing firms, family versus non-family firms
Family Non-family Difference excl.
firms firms Difference industry FEs
N (firm-year observations) 6,894 9,812
(41%) (59%)
Sales, million EUR 9.50 84.14 74.64*** 56.616***
(0.36) (2.83)
Employment 71.94 399.18 327.24*** 260.48***
(1.95) (9.32)
ln(labor productivity) 11.19 11.65 0.46*** 0.374***
(0.01) (0.01)
R&D intensity 0.51 0.89 0.38*** 0.14***
(0.02) (0.03)
Capital intensity 26.45 64.13 37.68*** 29.71***
(0.56) (1.78)
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. R&D intensity is equal to R&D expenditure (in EUR)/sales (in EUR)*100.
Capital intensity is capital (in thousand EUR)/employment. “Difference excluding industry fixed effects” denotes
the coefficient of a regression of the variable on a family firm dummy, controlling for industry fixed effects.
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Table 2: Effect of import competition on labor productivity — separate regressions
Dep var: ∆lnplabproditq (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Family firms Non-family firms
∆IMPst 2.078** 23.201** 23.347** 29.540** -1.062 -4.137 -4.199 -3.341
(0.838) (10.341) (10.593) (13.181) (0.912) (12.376) (12.500) (13.540)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq -2.088** -2.102** -2.668** 0.296 0.301 0.239
(1.022) (1.022) (1.285) (1.172) (1.183) (1.278)
lnplabprod93iq -0.063*** -0.057** -0.058** -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.068***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Effects evaluated at:
10th prod percentile n/a 4.013*** 4.033*** 5.024*** n/a -1.413 -1.429 -1.144
(1.239) (1.262) (1.615) (1.815) (1.832) (2.015)
90th prod percentile n/a 0.651 0.649 0.729 n/a -0.936 -0.944 -0.760
(1.104) (1.108) (1.145) (0.949) (0.945) (1.025)
Observations 6,507 6,507 6,507 6,434 7,834 7,834 7,834 7,759
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes
Firm FE yes yes
Number of firmid 662 822
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). Marginal effects are calculated as B∆lnplabproditqB∆IMPst  β1   β2lnplabprod93iq as specified in regression
equation (3.1) and evaluated at the 10th and 90th percentile of the inital productivity distribution (across all firms;
i.e., including both family and non-family firms).
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Table 3: Effect of import competition — pooled regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq
∆IMPst -4.137 -4.199 -3.693
(12.376) (12.500) (13.779)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq 0.296 0.301 -0.102 0.260
(1.172) (1.183) (0.120) (1.300)
∆IMPst  FAM93i 27.338* 27.546* 23.453** 31.302*
(15.920) (16.095) (11.736) (18.834)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i -2.385 -2.404 -2.032* -2.735
(1.551) (1.567) (1.197) (1.821)
FAM93i -0.121 -0.088 -0.253
(0.234) (0.248) (0.229)
lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i 0.009 0.010 0.009
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
lnplabprod93iq -0.066*** -0.068*** -0.065***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011)
Marginal effects:
Non-family firms, p10 -1.413 -1.429 -1.307
(1.815) (1.832) (2.058)
Non-family firms, p90 -0.936 -0.944 -0.890
(0.949) (0.945) (1.037)
Family firms, p10 4.013*** 4.033*** 4.866***
(1.239) (1.262) (1.728)
Family firms, p90 0.651 0.649 0.881
(1.104) (1.108) (1.236)
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** 5.462*** 4.785*** 6.173**
p 10 (2.089) (2.110) (1.350) (2.532)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 1.593 1.515 1.771
p 90 (1.593) (1.590) (1.704) (1.739)
Observations 14,341 14,341 14,341 14,195
Family firm dummy dummy dummy dummy
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Region * famfirm FE yes
Industry * year FE yes
Firm FE yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). There are 17 regions in our data (corresponding to autonomous regions in Spain). We estimate













 β1   β3   pβ2   β4q lnplabprod93iq,












 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq. We evaluate all marginal effects at the 10th and 90th percentile
of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
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Table 4: Horse race between family management and other observable firm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq
∆IMPst -4.137 56.867 4.264 -5.124 -8.686 174.169
(12.376) (60.819) (28.345) (12.390) (11.269) (123.188)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq 0.296 -6.735 -0.842 0.362 0.728 -18.877
(1.172) (5.897) (2.804) (1.172) (1.070) (11.663)
∆IMPst  FAM93i 27.338* 26.841* 28.084** 28.894* 32.846** 40.192***
(15.920) (14.673) (13.835) (15.980) (15.866) (14.768)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i -2.385 -2.275 -2.399* -2.533 -2.922* -3.595**
(1.551) (1.421) (1.360) (1.555) (1.553) (1.458)
∆IMPst  lnpsales93iq -3.203 -15.789
(3.651) (12.514)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  lnpsales93iq 0.377 1.668
(0.346) (1.183)
∆IMPst  lnpempl93iq -0.666 15.534
(6.194) (16.214)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  lnpempl93iq 0.129 -1.591
(0.600) (1.566)
∆IMPst  lnpR&Dint93iq 0.474 1.225
(1.977) (1.718)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  lnpR&Dint93iq -0.020 -0.098
(0.194) (0.169)
∆IMPst  lnpcapint93iq 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  lnpcapint93iq -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
FAM93i -0.121 -0.138 -0.129 -0.132 -0.119 -0.151
(0.234) (0.230) (0.234) (0.233) (0.238) (0.234)
lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i 0.009 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.013
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
lnplabprod93iq -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** 5.940*** 6.046*** 5.619*** 5.999*** 7.165***
p 10 (2.089) (1.993) (1.749) (2.093) (2.017) (1.787)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 2.278 2.185 1.541 1.296 1.378
p 90 (1.593) (1.425) (1.495) (1.555) (1.612) (1.575)
Observations 14,341 14,341 14,341 14,185 13,665 13,516
Family firm dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy
Industry*famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). sales93 is total firm sales in 1993. empl93 is total employment in 1993. of R&Dint93 is R&D
intensity (R&D expenditure/sales) in 1993. capint93 is capital intensity (capital/employment) in 1993. We













 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated at the 10th and 90th
percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
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Table 5: Managing versus non-managing family members
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq (1) (2) (3) (4)
Family members dummy dummy number number
∆IMPst -4.137 -3.143 -1.574 -0.416
(12.376) (12.413) (11.025) (11.109)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq 0.296 0.200 0.109 -0.004
(1.172) (1.174) (1.039) (1.045)
∆IMPst  FAMMGR93i 27.338* 30.768* 18.241** 19.429**
(15.920) (16.750) (8.660) (9.033)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  FAMMGR93i -2.385 -2.706* -1.711** -1.828**
(1.551) (1.632) (0.840) (0.878)
∆IMPst  FAMNOMGR93i -0.116 -12.909
(0.235) (11.186)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  FAMNOMGR93i 0.009 1.298
(0.024) (1.077)
FAMMGR93i -0.121 -0.066*** -0.020 -0.020
(0.234) (0.013) (0.110) (0.110)
lnplabprod93iq  FAMMGR93i 0.009 -24.103 0.002 0.002
(0.023) (23.459) (0.011) (0.011)
lnplabprod93iq -0.066*** 2.336 -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.013) (2.253) (0.012) (0.012)
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** 5.904*** 4.068** 4.241**
p 10 (2.089) (2.150) (1.824) (1.859)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 1.548 -0.375 -0.507
p 90 (1.593) (1.603) (1.274) (1.310)
Observations 14,341 14,341 14,341 14,341
Industry*famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Year*famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-
year pairs and firms). FAMMGR93i in columns (1) and (2) is a dummy variable if the firm has family
managers, and in column (3) and (4) it is the number of family managers. FAMNOMGR93i in columns
(1) and (2) is a dummy variable if the firm has family members in non-managing positions, and in column
(3) and (4) it is the number of family members in non-managing positions. The marginal effects for family
firms are computed for family firms with the average number of family managers (1.6). We estimate













 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated at the 10th and 90th
percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
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Table 6: Family ownership and management changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq family mgmt
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** 10.40* 10.78*** 1.677
p 10 (2.089) (5.473) (4.027) (2.116)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 3.076 -3.703 0.671
p 90 (1.593) (3.155) (4.677) (1.172)
Observations 14,341 3,086 8,885 14,341
Sample all family owned non-switchers all
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-
year pairs and firms). Sample “family owned” restricts the sample to firms that are family owned in 2006
(earlier information about family ownership is unfortunately not available in the data). Sample “non-switchers”
drops family firms that change to professional management at some point in the sample. We estimate re-














 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated at the 10th and 90th per-
centile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms). Regression coefficients are
not reported to save space, and are available on request.
Table 7: Mechanism: R&D and innovation related outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change Change in
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq R&D dummy ∆lnpR&D expitq # patents
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** -0.782 3.118 12.16
p 10 (2.089) (1.038) (8.946) (8.883)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 -0.333 4.942 -11.56
p 90 (1.593) (1.019) (3.485) (10.63)
Observations 14,341 14,169 4,769 14,283
Family firm dummy dummy dummy dummy
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). We estimate regression equation (3.2) and calculate the marginal differential effects for family












 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated
at the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
Regression coefficients are not reported to save space, and are available on request. Note that results in column (1)
are robust to using the samples in columns (2) to (4).
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Table 8: Decomposition of effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnpvalueaddeditq ∆lnpsalesitq ∆lnpmaterialitq ∆lnpemplitq ∆lnpcapitq
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** 5.594*** -0.675 -3.001* 0.168 -0.725
p 10 (2.089) (1.843) (1.074) (1.592) (1.507) (3.417)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 1.246 0.0390 -0.961 -0.340 -0.091
p 90 (1.593) (1.622) (1.031) (1.023) (0.843) (1.990)
Observations 14,341 14,341 14,341 14,340 14,341 14,024
Family firm dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). We estimate regression equation (3.2) and calculate the marginal differential effects for family












 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated
at the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
Regression coefficients are not reported to save space, and are available on request.
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Table 9: Heterogeneous effects by number of family managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal effects reported Non-family firms 1 fam mgr >1 fam mgr Non-family firms 1 fam mgr >1 fam mgr
Panel A. Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq
Family versus non-family firms, -1.413 3.999** 4.583* -1.307 4.084* 5.757*
p 10 (1.815) (1.851) (2.459) (2.058) (2.221) (3.207)
Family versus non-family firms, -0.936 0.282 1.058 -0.890 0.824 0.620
p 90 (0.939) (1.278) (2.058) (1.037) (1.436) (2.235)
Observations 7,834 3,580 2,927 7,759 3,536 2,900
Panel B. Dependent variable: New organizational method dummy
Family versus non-family firms, 0.301 0.728 2.223 0.115 1.128 3.421*
p 10 (0.807) (1.354) (2.227) (0.844) (1.380) (1.871)
Family versus non-family firms, -0.421 -1.091 -3.729** -0.401 -1.162 -3.775**
p 90 (0.806) (1.343) (1.710) (0.949) (1.371) (1.558)
Observations 7,899 3,551 2,871 7,827 3,508 2,844
Panel C. Dependent variable: New machinery dummy
Family versus non-family firms, -0.707 -1.715 -0.436 0.125 -2.045 0.536
p 10 (0.937) (1.399) (2.669) (0.929) (1.527) (2.224)
Family versus non-family firms, -0.658 -0.437 -4.498* -1.029 -0.129 -3.817
p 90 (0.823) (1.258) (2.671) (0.943) (1.155) (2.878)
Observations 7,899 3,551 2,871 7,827 3,508 2,844
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). We estimate regression equation (3.2) and calculate the marginal differential effects for family












 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated
at the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
Regression coefficients are not reported to save space, and are available on request.
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C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Consider the following:
1. Solving the P-type manager’s objective function in equation (5.2) yields βPpφq  φ.
Plugging this into the utility function, the manager gets a payoff of UP pφq  η  12 φ
2  f
as a function of the initial productivity draw. The manager will let the firm exit (before
exerting the effort) when she expects to receive a non-positive utility from running the
firm; we can solve for the non-exit cutoff of the firm by setting UP pφ̄Pq  0. Solving
for this means the firm exists iff φ ¥ φ̄P 
a
2p f  ηq. Because effort costs are strictly
positive for positive effort, the firm’s profit is strictly positive whenever the firm exists,
while the P-type manager’s payoff is only non-negative (i.e., zero at the cutoff).
2. The optimal profit function is βPpφq  φ and therefore increasing in φ.
3. Solving the F-type manager’s objective function in equation (5.1) also yields βFpφq  φ.
The manager will exert this as long as both his utility and firm profits are positive.
Under the assumption Ū ¡ fη2 , the profit function cuts the payoff function from below
and we only need to check for non-negative profits in order to understand when this
behavior is optimal. This means solving for πpφq  η   φ2  f  0 yields that this is
the optimal effort as long as φ ¥
a
p f  ηq. If φ  
a
p f  ηq, however, the manager
can avoid losing the private benefit Ū by exerting a bit more effort and keeping the
company alive. Making sure the firm’s profits are non-negative, i.e., solving for β in
πpβq  η   φβ  f  0 yields the effort function βF pφq 
fη
φ . Plugging the effort





. Under the assumption
Ū ¡ fη2 , this is strictly positive at φ 
a
p f  ηq so the manager gains by choosing
this effort level. However, if the initial productivity of the firm is too low, such that the
payoff function even under this utility is zero, the firm exits. The non-exit cutoff can
therefore be obtained from setting UF pφ̄Fq  0 which yields φ̄F 
fη?
2Ū
. The firm exits if
the productivity draw is below φ̄F.
4. Notice that βF pφq 
fη
φ is decreasing in φ, while βFpφq  φ is increasing in φ.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consider the following:
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1. As effort βPpφq  φ increases in φ, the realized productivity of P-type firms, βPpφqφ,
also increases in φ.
2. The same pattern holds for F-type firms, when φ ¥
a
f  η. Realized productivity







3. P-type firms have higher average realized productivity than F-type firms as P-type firms
have a higher exit cutoff than F-type firms and realized productivity weakly increases
in the initial productivity φ for both types of firms.
4. Note that for any value of realized productivity above 2p f  ηq the corresponding value
of the initial productivity draw is the same for P-type firms and F-type firms. Also
note that only F-type firms have realized productivity below p f  ηq. Since the initial
productivity draw follows the same Pareto distribution for both F-type firms and P-type
firms, the distribution of realized productivity of P-type firms first order stochastically
dominates that of F-type firms.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider:
1. Notice that both exit cutoffs (i.e., φ̄P and φ̄F) are increasing functions of η and therefore
both exit cutoffs increase after import competition intensifies. However, both effort
βPpφq  φ and realized productivity φβPpφq of surviving P-type firms are independent
of η, and therefore do not change after import competition increases.
2. For the same argument, effort and realized productivity of surviving F-type firms
are independent of η as long as productivity is high enough after the shock, i.e., φ ¥a
f  η2. However, effort below the kink
a
f  η2 is an increasing function of η. For








, the manager’s effort after the import shock is
βpφ, η2q 
fη2




























Realized productivity is a positive function of effort for surviving firms, so realized
productivity increases for these firms.
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3. As only the realized productivity for initially unproductive surviving F-type firm in-
creases, i.e., φ  
a
f  η2, and the realized productivity of all other firms are unchanged,
the proposition follows directly.49
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider the following:
1. The exit cutoff on the realized log productivity is φ̄PβPpφ̄Pq  2p f  ηq and φ̄FβFpφ̄Fq 
f  η for P-type firms and F-type firms, respectively. As both cutoffs are decreasing
functions of η, both cutoffs increase when import competition increases. Furthermore,
the exit probability (either zero or one) decreases in the initially realized productivity, as
firms exit if and only if their realized productivity is below the exit cutoff.
2. Note that the exit cutoff on realized productivity is always higher for P type than for F
type firms. Therefore, P type firms are more likely to exit than F type firms when import
competition increases, if both of them have the same initial realized productivity.
49Notice that, strictly speaking, we should not observe P-type firms that are as unproductive as those F-type
firms that are increasing their productivity in the data. However, the real world is probably more complex than
our stylized model: Either measurement error in productivity, a random component to realized productivity after
exerting effort, or smaller fixed cost for F-type firms can generate the overlap in initial productivity among family
and non-family firms that we see in the data while preserving the predictions of the model. For an example of
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D ONLINE APPENDIX - Data Description
This paper uses panel data from a Spanish survey of manufacturing firms (ESEE; Encuesta So-
bre Estrategias Empresariales) that is collected by the Fundación SEPI, a foundation affiliated
with the Spanish Ministry of Finance and Public Administration. The ESEE started in 1990.
Since then, about 1,800 firms are surveyed every year. SEPI points out that they put special
effort in systematically tracking changes in the firms legal status (e.g., mergers, acquisitions,
etc.). ESEE is designed to be a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing firms. All
firms with more than 200 employees are included in the survey; firms between 10 and 200
employees were selected through a stratified, proportional and systematic sampling. In 1990,
2,188 firms were part of the survey. The initial firms are tracked annually until they either
exit or become non-responsive. Non-responsive firms are contacted by SEPI repeatedly to
encourage participation and their legal status is tracked down (e.g., exit); if this is fruitless,
new firms are incorporated in the panel designed to preserve the consistency of the sample.
More information about the data set and researcher access are provided on their website:
https://www.fundacionsepi.es/investigacion/esee/en/spresentacion.asp.
We used the following variables in the analysis:
Family firms
The variable PAFDG gives the “Number of owners and working family members who hold
managing positions in the company on December 31” of a year. Note that an owner is not
necessarily a majority owner and a founder is not necessarily an owner. Our main regressor,
called family firm or family-managed firm, is a dummy variable that is 1 if the number of
owners and working relatives holding managing positions is bigger than or equal to one.
Also note that while the data set includes information on the number of family managers, it
does not contain information of the number of overall managers (i.e., professional managers).
Figure E.1 shows the distribution of the number of family managers for family-managed
firms in 1993. Figure E.2 shows the distribution of family firms across industries in 1993. The
share of family firms varies between 17% in industries like beverages and vehicles to 69%
in leather/fur/footwear and furniture. Table F.2 shows the number of family firms across
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all years in the sample. Table F.3 shows that there is no significant relationship between
the changes in import tariffs and the changes in the share of family firms across industries.
Furthermore, Table F.4 runs regressions at the firm level and shows that neither the number
of family managers nor the probability of being a family firm is correlated with tariff changes
or the firm’s initial productivity.
The variable PAFOO gives the “Number of owners and working family members who
hold non-managing positions in the company on December 31” of a year. Figure E.3 shows
the distribution of the number of family members in non-managing positions for firms that
have at least 1 family member in non-managing positions in 1993.
In order to distinguish family management from family ownership, we use the indicator
variable FAMILI which indicates whether “a family group participates actively in the control
and/or management of the company.” As this variable is only available in 2006, we use
this value to classify firms as family-owned throughout the sample period, assuming family
ownership is persistent.
Productivity
Our main productivity measure is labor productivity, defined as deflated value added per
worker (using input and output deflators at the firm level):
labprod93i  pVENTAS OUTPR COINT  INPRq {PERTOT
using the following variables from ESEE as inputs into in the calculation:
The variable VENTAS gives sales in euro. This variable includes the sales of goods, the
sales of transformed products (finished and half-finished), and the provision of services and
other sales (packages, packaging, byproducts and waste). Discounts and sales returns are
excluded. We use the variable VPV, which reports the percentage change in sales prices
compared to the previous year, to construct an annual firm level output deflator OUTPR that
equals 1 in 1993, our base year.
We use the variable COINT, which gives the sum of purchases of goods and external
services minus the variation in the stock of purchases in euro, as a measure of intermediate
inputs. We use the variable VPCOINT, which reports the percentage change in prices of
intermediate consumption compared to the previous year, to construct an annual firm level
input deflator INPR that equals 1 in 1993, our base year.
We use the variable PERTOT, which gives the total personnel employed at the company
as of December 31st, as a measure of employment.
Notice that our price correction can only be applied to changes in prices, not in order to
compare differences across firms. We normalize the price indices for each firm to be equal to 1
in 1993 (our base year), which means that we measure labor productivity in 1993 in values.
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The price adjustment therefore compares changes in productivity with respect to their initial
levels in 1993.
In robustness checks we use an alternative productivity measure, denoted as TFPOP,
to measure total factor productivity (TFP). We use the Olley and Pakes (1996) estimation
approach augmented with a De Loecker-type correction, which allows for the family status (of
the firm) and import tariffs to directly affect the evolution of firm TFP (i.e., De Loecker, 2007,
2013). In Olley and Pakes (1996) the value of investment is used as the proxy in the estimation.
The variable CIM gives the value of investment. The variable IN gives value of total net
fixed assets, which is the value of fixed assets minus the accumulated depreciation and
reserves in euro. Note that this is based on firm-specific depreciation so we do not need to use
industry-specific or even economy-wide depreciation rates. In our data, 83% of observations
have positive investment values; the problem of too-frequent zeros in investment is not a big
concern in this case. For the De Loecker (2007)-type correction we include a dummy variable
for family firms in the production function in order to account for the possibility that family
firms might have different technologies than non-family firms; and we include a dummy
variable for family firms as well as import tariffs into the inversion step of the Olley-Pakes-
style TFP estimation (i.e., the second step) as our empirical finding suggests that these two
variables may affect firm productivity (even conditioning on the same technology). Finally, as
we do not have enough observations in each of the twenty industries, we group firms into
light manufacturing industries (NACECLIO industry codes: 1-10) and heavy manufacturing
industries (NACECLIO industry codes: 11-20) to implement the productivity estimation.
We also alternatively divide deflated value added by total hours worked (using the vari-
able HETN denoting total effective hours worked) or by the total wage bill (using the variable
CP which records gross salaries and wages, compensation, social security contributions paid
by the company, contributions made to supplementary pension systems, and other social
expenses).
Innovation and R&D
The variable GTID reports total expenses in R&D (including internal and external R&D
expenses) from which we construct the R&D dummy and log R&D expenses.
Variables PATESP and PATEXT report the number of patents registered in Spain and
abroad, respectively. We use the sum of both to construct the total number of patents registered
in a given year.
The variable TIPSO is a categorical variable that records the kind of process innova-
tion undertaken by the company during the course of the year. Possible answers include
organizational methods and/or the introduction of new machinery.
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Exit
The variable IDSIT has four values: 0 without access (impossible to contact the firm or
temporary closure); 1 if the firm answers; 2 if the firm disappears (definite closure or company
in liquidation or change to non-manufacturing activity or taken over by another company or
less important company merged with other company), 3 if the firm refuses to collaborate. We
treat observations whose value for IDSIT is 2 as firm-year pairs that exit in a given year.
Industry classification and trade-related variables
The variable NACECLIO indicates the industry within which the firm operates. In total, we
have 20 industries (it is not possible to obtain a more disaggregated split due to confidentiality
issues). The 20 industries are: meat related products; food and tobacco; beverage; textiles and
clothing; leather, fur, and footwear; timber; paper; printing and publishing; chemicals; plastic
and rubber products; nonmetal mineral products; basic metal products; fabricated metal
products; industrial and agricultural equipment; office machinery, data processing, precision
instruments and similar; electric materials and accessories; vehicles and accessories; other
transportation materials; furniture; miscellaneous. The industries are based on the Spanish
CNAE classification.
The variables VEXPOR and VIMPOR report the value of exports and imports in euro,
respectively.
The variable IMPTEC indicates the value of imported technologies (i.e. payments for
licenses and technical aid from abroad) from which we construct a dummy variable for
whether the firm used imported technologies in a given year.
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E ONLINE APPENDIX - Figures
Figure E.1: Number of family managers per family firm, 1993
Figure E.2: Distribution of family firms across industries, 1993
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Figure E.3: Number of family members in non-managing positions for firms that have any,
1993
Figure E.4: Distribution of initial labor productivity, by type of firm, 1993
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F ONLINE APPENDIX - Tables
Table F.1: Changes in import tariffs, across time




































Table F.3: Relationship between tariff changes and changes in family firm share, industry-level
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
∆share of family firms
∆IMPst 0.044 0.139 0.300
(0.186) (0.222) (0.275)
Observations 280 280 280
Year FEs no yes yes
Industry FEs no no yes
Notes: The data for this table is collapsed to the industry level. This table shows that there is no significant
relationship between changes in import tariffs and changes in the share of family-managed firms of an industry. *
p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms).
Table F.4: Relationship between tariff changes and changes in family firms, firm-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆number ∆number ∆number ∆Prob ∆Prob ∆Prob
fam mgr fam mgr fam mgr fam mgd firm fam mgd firm fam mgd firm
∆IMPst -0.626 -0.624 1.726 -0.544 -0.543 2.508
(0.983) (0.982) (9.850) (0.649) (0.649) (5.439)
lnplabprod93iq 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq -0.229 -0.297
(0.917) (0.506)
Observations 14,354 14,354 14,354 14,507 14,507 14,507
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms).
Table F.5: Effect of import competition for family versus non-family firms
Dep var: ∆lnplabproditq (1) (2) (3)
All Family Non-family
Sample: firms firms firms
∆IMPst 0.224 2.078** -1.062
(0.660) (0.838) (0.912)
lnplabprod93iq -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.065***
(0.013) (0.023) (0.011)
Observations 14,355 6,507 7,834
Year FE yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms).
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Table F.6: Productivity responses are immediate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep var: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq
Sample: Family Non-family Family Non-family
firms firms firms firms
∆IMPst 23.201** -4.137 33.120** 13.148
(10.341) (12.376) (14.724) (13.459)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq -2.088** 0.296 -3.200** -1.325
(1.022) (1.172) (1.462) (1.274)
∆IMPst1 -8.659 -0.088
(21.861) (12.446)
∆IMPst1  lnplabprod93iq 0.620 0.086
(2.142) (1.185)
lnplabprod93iq -0.057** -0.066*** 0.001 -0.015*
(0.024) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008)
Current effects evaluated at:
10th prod percentile 4.013*** -1.413 3.715** 0.970
(1.239) (1.815) (1.501) (1.924)
90th prod percentile 0.651 -0.936 -1.437 -1.163
(1.104) (0.949) (1.345) (0.922)
Lagged effects evaluated at:
10th prod percentile -2.965 0.703
(2.491) (1.784)
90th prod percentile -1.967 0.841
(1.817) (1.005)
Observations 6,507 7,834 5,788 6,952
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). Marginal effects are calculated for different percentiles of the initial productivity distribution,
analogous to the main tables.
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Table F.7: Effect of import competition — non-parametric regressions
Dep var: ∆lnplabproditq (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Family firms Non-family firms
∆IMPst 3.311*** 3.841*** 3.001* 3.333** -1.284 -1.677 -1.790 -1.018
(1.081) (1.299) (1.666) (1.555) (1.386) (1.396) (1.886) (1.686)
∆IMPst  Perc2 0.629 0.507 3.524** 2.763* -0.930 -2.633 -0.824 -1.313
(1.067) (1.278) (1.460) (1.538) (0.958) (1.604) (1.498) (1.670)
∆IMPst  Perc3 1.144 -0.048 2.062 0.014 -3.296*** -2.430*
(1.169) (1.708) (2.169) (1.084) (1.273) (1.474)
∆IMPst  Perc4 1.352 1.264 0.669 -1.663
(1.101) (1.623) (1.128) (1.630)
∆IMPst  Perc5 0.497 0.115
(1.316) (1.243)
Observations 6,507 6,507 6,507 6,507 7,834 7,834 7,834 7,834
Nr of percentiles 2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
Percentile FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms).
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Table F.8: Effect of import competition — pooled regression; period 1993 to 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq
Marginal effects:
Non-family firms, p10 -2.925 -2.993 -3.072
(2.239) (2.256) (2.831)
Non-family firms, p90 -0.112 -0.0610 0.198
(1.221) (1.210) (1.341)
Family firms, p10 3.354** 3.418** 4.814**
(1.492) (1.533) (2.414)
Family firms, p90 2.845 2.844 2.342
(2.203) (2.206) (2.399)
Family versus non-family firms, 6.279** 6.411** 3.807** 7.886***
p 10 (2.447) (2.498) (1.490) (2.999)
Family versus non-family firms, 2.957 2.905 3.486 2.144
p 90 (2.702) (2.686) (2.796) (2.678)
Observations 8,958 8,958 8,958 8,958
Family firm dummy dummy dummy dummy
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Region * famfirm FE yes
Industry * year FE yes
Firm FE yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). There are 17 regions in our data (corresponding to autonomous regions in Spain). We estimate













 β1   β3   pβ2   β4q lnplabprod93iq,












 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq. We evaluate all marginal effects at the 10th and 90th percentile
of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
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Table F.9: Effect of import competition — number of family managers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq
Marginal effects (family firms = firms with average number of family managers):
Non-family firms, p10 -0.569 -0.566 -0.627
(1.680) (1.695) (1.908)
Non-family firms, p90 -0.393 -0.391 -0.232
(0.888) (0.887) (0.979)
Family firms, p10 3.499*** 3.499*** 4.797***
(1.184) (1.193) (1.808)
Family firms, p90 -0.767 -0.793 -0.941
(0.956) (0.955) (1.065)
Family versus non-family firms, 4.068** 4.065** 3.603*** 5.424**
p 10 (1.824) (1.821) (1.303) (2.391)
Family versus non-family firms, -0.375 -0.403 -0.581 -0.709
p 90 (1.274) (1.270) (1.447) (1.324)
Observations 14,341 14,341 14,341 14,195
Family firm # members # members # members # members
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Region * famfirm FE yes
Industry * year FE yes
Firm FE yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). Same regressions as in Table 3, except that the family firm dummy is replaced by NRFAM93i;
the number of family managers in 1993. Famfirm for the fixed effects is still a family firm dummy. The marginal
effects for family firms are computed for family firms with the average number of family managers (1.6). Marginal
effects are computed with respect to different percentiles of the initial productivity distribution. Regression
coefficients are omitted to preserve space;but are available upon request. For the specification in column (1) we
evaluate the differential marginal effects also separately for different number of family managers:
By number of family managers
Marginal effects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family versus non-family firms, 2.522** 5.043** 7.565** 10.087** 12.609** 15.130** 17.652**
p 10 (1.131) (2.262) (3.393) (4.524) (5.655) (6.786) (7.917)
Family versus non-family firms, -0.232 -0.465 -0.697 -0.929 -1.161 -1.394 -1.626
p 90 (0.789) (1.579) (2.369) (3.158) (3.948) (4.737) (5.527)
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Table F.10: Effect of import competition — lagged TFP instead of TFP in 1993
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 3.180** 3.892*
p 10 (1.544) (2.36)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.035 -0.574
p 90 (1.625) (2.223)
Observations 14,341 21,868
Family firm status FAMi 1993 t 1
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes
Industry * year FE yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-
year pairs and firms). In column (2), we group lagged labor productivity into 20 percentiles per calendar year
(the results are not sensitive to the number of percentile bins used). We estimate regression equation (3.2)












 β3   β4lnplabprodi,t1q, evaluated at the 10th and 90th percentile of the overall produc-
tivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms). Regression coefficients are not reported to save space,
and are available on request.
Table F.11: Robustness — alternative productivity measures
Dependent variable: ∆lnpproditq (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity measure (in logs): TFP OP TFP OP VA/hours VA/hours VA/wages VA/wages
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.506*** 3.752** 4.824** 3.270** 6.241*** 4.797***
p 10 (2.022) (1.535) (2.038) (1.466) (1.950) (1.833)
Family versus non-family firms, 0.847 1.332 2.111 2.288 2.946*** 1.702
p 90 (1.563) (1.697) (1.472) (1.593) (1.107) (1.097)
Observations 13,418 13,418 13,838 13,838 14,341 14,341
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry * year FE yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). TFPOP uses estimated total factor productivity using a Olley-Pakes type estimation approach
augmented with a De Loecker-type correction (details in online appendix). VA/hours= deflated value added
per hour worked. VA/wages=deflated value added divided by the total wagebill. All TFP measures are logged.













 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated at the 10th and 90th
percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms). Regression coefficients
are not reported to save space, and are available on request.
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Table F.12: Robustness — propensity score reweighing and nearest neighbor matching
Dependent variable: ∆lnpproditq (1) (3)
Method: IPSW NN
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 9.000*** 7.785***
p 10 (3.073) (2.443)
Family versus non-family firms, 0.209 2.348
p 90 (3.629) (2.125)
Observations 14,314 12,287
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-
year pairs and firms). IPSW = inverse propensity score reweighing. NN = nearest neighbor matching. Both
methods use the following variables to predict family firm status in 1993: log labor productivity, log sales,
log employment, and an export dummy. Nearest neighbor matching uses 5 neighbors. We estimate re-














 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated at the 10th and 90th per-
centile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms). Regression coefficients are
not reported to save space, and are available on request.
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Table F.13: Controlling for input and export tariffs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq
∆IMPst -4.137 5.226 -5.920 0.690
(12.376) (13.036) (11.826) (11.903)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq 0.296 -0.618 0.496 -0.142
(1.172) (1.242) (1.118) (1.128)
∆IMPst  FAM93i 27.338* 35.290* 23.344 21.037
(15.920) (19.722) (15.453) (15.428)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i -2.385 -3.215* -2.023 -1.813
(1.551) (1.931) (1.496) (1.505)
∆INTARst 43.351** 28.402
(19.855) (24.892)
∆INTARst  lnplabprod93iq -4.299** -2.747
(1.957) (2.423)
∆INTARst  FAM93i 62.431 -4.812
(58.434) (31.079)




∆EXPTARst  lnplabprod93iq 1.018** 0.859
(0.472) (0.525)
∆EXPTARst  FAM93i -11.117 -11.011
(7.564) (7.435)
∆EXPTARst  lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i 1.073 1.060
(0.754) (0.741)
FAM93i -0.121 -0.067 -0.217 -0.215
(0.234) (0.235) (0.155) (0.172)
lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i 0.009 0.004 0.020 0.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.015) (0.016)
lnplabprod93iq -0.066*** -0.069*** -0.060*** -0.063***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** 5.753** 4.756** 4.379**
p 10 (2.089) (2.387) (2.080) (2.021)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 0.578 1.499 1.461
p 90 (1.593) (1.825) (1.462) (1.567)
Observations 14,341 14,341 14,341 14,341
Family firm dummy dummy dummy dummy
Industry * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Year * famfirm FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses
are two-way clustered (by industry-year pairs and firms). INTAR denotes a weighted average of import tariffs of
the inputs of an industry, where input shares are constructed from the Spanish IO tables. EXPTAR denotes the
weighted average of tariffs that other countries impose on imports from the EU. Effects evaluated at 10th (and
90th) percentile refer to the effects of average (annual) import tariff reduction on the change of log productivity for
firms that are at the 10th (and 90th) percentile of the overall initial productivity distribution in 1993 (i.e., including
both family and non-family firms).
65
Table F.14: Importing and exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in importing Change in imported Change
Dependent variable: dummy ∆lnpimpitq technology dummy ∆lnpimp techitq exporting dummy ∆lnpexpitq
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, -1.471 0.365 -0.499 -4.473 -1.058 8.689
p 10 (1.302) (5.900) (0.615) (22.77) (1.097) (6.614)
Family versus non-family firms, 0.262 3.308 1.051 -16.04 0.767 5.631
p 90 (1.199) (3.271) (1.075) (18.40) (0.796) (3.848)
Observations 14,203 8,352 14,283 1,341 14,291 8,566
Family firm dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy dummy
Industry*famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year*famfirm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). We estimate regression equation (3.2) and calculate the marginal differential effects for family












 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated
at the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
Regression coefficients are not reported to save space, and are available on request.
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Table F.15: No differential change in employment
(1) (2) (5) (6)
∆lnplabproditq ∆lnpempqit ∆lnptemporaryqit ∆ f amemplit
∆IMPst -4.137 -4.342 79.696 -7.438
(12.376) (11.370) (77.306) (15.103)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq 0.296 0.419 -7.565 0.434
(1.172) (1.107) (7.217) (1.473)
∆IMPst  FAM93i 27.338* 3.069 103.024 21.148
(15.920) (12.963) (85.003) (34.461)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i -2.385 -0.316 -8.839 -1.697
(1.551) (1.257) (7.786) (3.306)
FAM93i -0.121 -0.093 0.262 -0.024
(0.234) (0.096) (0.977) (0.261)
lnplabprod93iq  FAM93i 0.009 0.006 -0.009 0.002
(0.023) (0.009) (0.089) (0.025)
lnplabprod93iq -0.066*** 0.014** 0.039 -0.010
(0.013) (0.007) (0.043) (0.010)
Marginal effects:
Family versus non-family firms, 5.426*** 0.168 21.81 5.554
p 10 (2.089) (1.507) (14.40) (4.756)
Family versus non-family firms, 1.587 -0.340 7.579 2.822
p 90 (1.593) (0.843) (5.617) (2.923)
Observations 14,341 14,341 2,086 14,341
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: emp denotes the total number of employees. temporary denotes the number of employees employed
through a temporary agency (variable PERETT). f amemp denotes the total number of family members working in
the firm. * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). We estimate regression equation (3.2) and calculate the marginal differential effects for family












 β3   β4lnplabprod93iq, evaluated
at the 10th and 90th percentile of the initial productivity distribution (i.e., across non-family and family firms).
67
Table F.16: Robustness check: time horizon
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep var: ∆lnplabproditq ∆lnplabproditq ∆2lnplabproditq ∆2lnplabproditq
Sample: Family Non-family Family Non-family
firms firms firms firms
∆IMPst 23.201** -4.137 29.752** 21.655
(10.341) (12.376) (13.891) (20.427)
∆IMPst  lnplabprod93iq -2.088** 0.296 -2.673* -2.073
(1.022) (1.172) (1.381) (1.957)
lnplabprod93iq -0.057** -0.066*** -0.107** -0.118***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.051) (0.028)
Effects evaluated at:
10th prod percentile 4.013*** -1.413 5.193*** 2.607
(1.239) (1.815) (1.471) (2.619)
90th prod percentile 0.651 -0.936 0.890 -0.730
(1.104) (0.949) (1.378) (1.235)
Observations 6,507 7,834 3,117 3,736
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Industry FE yes yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms). Marginal effects are calculated at different percentiles of the initial productivity distribution.
Table F.17: Exits
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: exit dummy
Sample: all non-family family
∆IMPst 0.210* 0.234* 0.167
(0.119) (0.128) (0.232)
lnplabprod93iq -0.004*** -0.002 -0.007***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 22,524 12,319 10,176
Industry FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Notes: * p 0.05, ** p 0.01, *** p 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered (by industry-year
pairs and firms).
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